Bakke, Grutter, and the Principle of Subsidiarity by Widulski, Peter
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 32
Number 4 Summer 2005 Article 1
1-1-2005
Bakke, Grutter, and the Principle of Subsidiarity
Peter Widulski
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Widulski, Bakke, Grutter, and the Principle of Subsidiarity, 32 Hastings Const. L.Q. 847 (2005).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol32/iss4/1




In his 1931 encyclical, Quadragesimo anno, Pius XI provided the
following statement of the principle of subsidiarity, which, he said,
4Cremains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy":
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they
can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it
to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time
a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater
and higher association what lesser and subordinate
organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very
nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and
never destroy and absorb them.'
In a recent article on the principle of subsidiarity, Robert K.
Vischer observes that while this principle owes its origin and
development to papal encyclicals and Catholic social theorists, it has
become a matter of analysis, argument, and application deployed as
well by non-Catholic thinkers and institutions.2 In Vischer's account,
subsidiarity "is a principled tendency toward solving problems at the
local level and empowering individuals, families, and voluntary
associations to act more efficaciously in their own lives."3
Accordingly, "[o]nly when the lower bodies prove ineffective should
the federal government [in the American context] become involved."
4
* Westerfield Fellow, Loyola University School of Law / New Orleans. The author wishes
to thank Loyola Law School for a summer research grant that helped make this paper
possible.
1. Pius XI, Quadragesimo anno, § 79 (1931).
2. Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution,
35 IND. L. REV. 103,107-108 (2001).
3. Id. at 116.
4. Id. at 103.
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In European politics, the principle is embodied in the German
Constitution,5 and as Vischer notes, subsidiarity "is a founding
principle of the European Union and has been cited as a factor in the
Eastern European freedom movements of the 1980s. ''6 As Vischer
also observes, in the United States the subsidiarity principle
"underlies a wide variety of current legislative actions" and has been
invoked, largely by conservatives, in a number of public policy
debates, ranging over such issues as poverty programs, environmental
law, and campaign finance reform.7
The status of subsidiarity in the American constitutional order
and in American politics has in the recent past been subject to
differing interpretations prompted by different inquiries. George A.
Bermann has conducted a thoroughgoing analysis of the extent to
which the subsidiarity principle as embodied in European Community
law is reflected in constitutional or other legal restraints on the
exercise of the power of the federal government in the United States.'
Accordingly, he focuses on subsidiarity as reflected in Article 3b of
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community: "In
areas which do not fall within its exclusive province, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community." 9
The scope of subsidiarity in this form is the relationship of a
federal government and member states - and so, not including non-
political communities - with respect to matters of shared competence.
The principle's injunction is that "federal action should be taken in
areas of shared competence only if the goal in question cannot be
5. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 338 n.17 (1994).
6. Vischer, supra note 2, at 104. For the role of subsidiarity in the founding of the
European Union, see Bermann, supra note 5, at 344-348.
7. Vischer, supra note 2, at 104-105. Senator Rick Santorum is among those
conservatives who have employed arguments based on subsidiarity. See Rick Santorum, A
Compassionate Conservative Agenda: Addressing Poverty for the Next Millennium, 26 J.
LEGIS. 93 (2000) and RICK SANTORUM, IT TAKES A FAMILY: CONSERVATISM AND THE
COMMON GOOD (2005) (especially Chapter VIII). Vischer argues that liberal policies are
consistent with the subsidiarity principle. See Vischer, supra note 2, Part IV.
8. Bermann, supra note 5, at 403-448.
9. Id. at 345-346 (quoting Article 3b).
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adequately achieved by action at the state level or below."'' Bermann
argues that subsidiarity as thus defined is operationally and
analytically distinct from United States federalism because the latter
"places greater emphasis on the presence of an overall balance of
power between the federal government and the states than on respect
for any single rule for allocating competences among the different
levels of government."" He concludes that while there is some
evidence of concern for subsidiarity expressed in some congressional
legislation, 2 Supreme Court decisions, 3 and executive orders, 4 "the
U.S. system offers few political or legal guarantees that the federal
government will act only when persuaded that the states cannot or
will not do so on their own."15
Other writers have advanced a more favorable view of the role of
subsidiarity in the American constitutional order. David P. Currie
has argued that "subsidiarity is the guiding principle of federalism in
the United States.', 16 Currie contends that the Virginia Plan proposed
by Edmund Randolph would have made the subsidiarity principle
(similar in form to that in the European Community) an explicit part
of the American Constitution." Currie acknowledges that as a result
of the replacement of Randolph's principle with a list of enumerated
powers that, after some modification, became Section 8 of Article I,
10. Id. at 452.
11. Id. at 450.
12. Id. at 414-416.
13. Id. at 418-421. Of interest, given this paper's attention to Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, is Bermann's statement that "Justice O'Connor has been a
strong advocate of greater political autonomy for the states." Id. at 405 n.290; see also id.
at 420 n.340 ("[I]t is Justice O'Connor's dissent in Garcia[v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)] that is most sympathetic to the idea of enforcing
subsidiarity through the Tenth Amendment.").
14. Id. at 436-447.
15. Id. at 403.
16. David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 359 (1998). See also Vischer,
supra note 2, at 123 ("From executive orders requiring that a proposed federal action be
weighed against the efficacy of state action, to congressional restraint in areas of state
regulatory competence, to judicial enforcement of state-federal boundaries, much of this
country's political and legal landscape comports fully with subsidiarity's ideal." (footnotes
omitted)).
17. Currie, supra note 16, at 359-360. The Virginia Plan contained the provision that
"the National Legislature ought to be impowered [sic] to enjoy the Legislative Rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the
several States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation ." Id. at 360 (quoting Max Farrand, 1
Records of the Federal Convention 21 (Yale, rev. ed. 1937)).
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"it is neither necessary nor sufficient, in contesting the validity of a
federal statute, to argue that the matter might as well have been left
to the states." 8 Currie contends nevertheless that Article I, section 8
of the Constitution "is a concretization of the subsidiarity principle,"
and he provides examples of congressional action that he thinks have
been influenced by the subsidiarity principle.'9 He concludes that
"[i]n the United States the Constitution says nothing about
subsidiarity, but it is widely followed in practice." 20
While Currie focuses on congressional practice,2' other authors
have found the subsidiarity principle reflected in, or helpful in
interpreting, certain Supreme Court opinions. Kirk A. Kennedy has
argued that "[i]n key cases addressing issues of federalism and the
parameters of congressional power, [Justice Clarence] Thomas has
consistently adhered to a position that mirrors the natural law
doctrine of subsidiarity. '' 22 Kennedy points in particular to Justice
Thomas's dissenting opinion in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,23
as "implicitly yet perfectly reflect[ing] the natural law's inherent
principle of subsidiarity. '' 24  And relying on a broader view of
subsidiarity that encompasses non-political communities such as the
family,25 Richard W. Garnett has argued that subsidiarity supplies an
important reason why the Supreme Court's decision in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters26 was correct 7 and provides a basis for understanding
18. Id. at 360. Currie also acknowledges that "[t]he Civil War Amendments represent
an exception to [the subsidiarity] principle." Id. at 360 n.4.
19. Id. at 360-363.
20. Id. at 364.
21. In an interesting article on the American situation that is broad in scope, Stephen
Gardbaum has proposed a model of constitutional federalism in the American context
that, in his view, "has close affinities" with the structure of the European Union in light of
the latter's incorporation of the subsidiarity principle. Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking
Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 831 (1996).
22. Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence
Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33,82 (1997).
23. 54 U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 79. Kennedy finds further support for Justice Thomas's adherence to
subsidiarity in Thomas's concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) and in Thomas's joining the majority opinion in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
25. For this broader view of subsidiarty, see the quotation from Quadragesimo anno,
supra note 1, the quotation from Vischer, supra note 2, and Section 1, below.
26. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
27. Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education,
and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 143-146 (2000).
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why school choice plans can be constitutionally permissible.s
In light of the interest reflected in the articles discussed above in
the question of the status of the principle of subsidiarity in American
law, I want explore this matter further, albeit in a very limited
context. My interest is not to argue for some broad and significant
import of the subsidiarity principle in American law. Rather, I wish
to explore the possibility that two Supreme Court opinions dealing
with universities can be understood as significantly reflecting
considerations grounded in the principle of subsidiarity. I will argue
in particular that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and the Supreme
Court's decision in Grutter both engage in analyses and offer
conclusions that reflect important subsidiarity concepts and concerns.
It is important to state at the outset that I am not arguing that either
Justice Powell's opinion or the Grutter Court's decision was correct as
a matter of constitutional law. Nor am I arguing that either explicitly
invoked the principle of subsidiarity (they clearly do not). I will
simply argue that Justice Powell's opinion and the Grutter majority's
opinion undertake analyses and arrive at certain conclusions that
reflect key subsidiarity concepts.
Part I examines the traditional meaning of subsidiarity as
presented in certain papal documents and in the writings of the
Catholic natural law philosopher, John Finnis. I call this the
"traditional" meaning of subsidiarity because it rests on Catholic
teaching and philosophical exposition advanced prior to the adoption
of subsidiarity as a constitutional principle of the European
Community. This traditional meaning is broader in scope in that it is
grounded in the good of the individual and includes respect for sub-
political communities such as - of particular importance here -
educational institutions. The traditional principle cautions against
actions by higher authorities that might stifle initiatives undertaken
by individuals and communities, particularly where a community or
institution has a recognized mission that serves the common good.
Part II prepares the way for a subsidiarity-sensitive examination
of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and of the Supreme Court's
decision in Grutter. Employing concepts developed in Part I, I
explore what a Supreme Court decision reflecting subsidiarity
concerns might look like in a case in which the Court has to interpret
a constitutional provision that restricts the activities of subsidiary
institutions. If the Court were to interpret the constitutional
28. Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education,
Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281, 1311-1312 (2002).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
provision in such a way that allows scope for the initiative of a
subsidiary institution such as a university, and if this allowance
reflected subsidiarity concerns, the Court's opinion would likely
recognize that the university has a mission that serves the common
good and would accord some deference to the educational judgment
of the university.
Part III reviews Justice Powell's Bakke opinion and finds that
subsidiarity themes play significant roles in the opinion. Most
important is the concept of the University of California at Davis's
("the University's") mission. In its briefs, the University did not
devote any explicit attention to this concept, nor did it present an
argument that its race-conscious admissions program was central to
its mission. Justice Powell makes use of the concept of the academic
mission in his review of the purposes the University offered for its
special admissions program. He rejects the University's goal of
redressing the effects of societal discrimination (upon which the
University had placed great emphasis in its brief) because this goal is
beyond the scope of the University's educational mission. On the
other hand - and of great significance for Bakke and subsequently for
Grutter - he finds that the University's goal of seeking a diverse
student body is of paramount importance to its mission. Justice
Powell grounds this positive conclusion about the University's
mission in the First Amendment's special concern for academic
freedom - a grounding, again, not argued for by the University in its
briefs. Especially important for this paper is the fact that this resort
to the First Amendment, rather than removing the evaluation of the
University's admissions program from subsidiarity concerns, is used
to support another subsidiarity concept, the contribution to the
common good - here made possible by academic freedom and
fostered by the University's mission.
Shifting attention to Grutter, Part IV examines the University of
Michigan Law School's ("the Law School's") brief in that case to
explore the arguments the Law School employed to justify its race-
conscious admissions program. These arguments invoke several
subsidiarity concerns. Most importantly, the Law School adopted the
prominence Justice Powell gave to the concept of the academic
mission, and the Law School argued that its diversity admissions
program was central to its educational mission in service to the
common good. The Law School's brief implicitly accepts that Justice
Powell's Opinion outlined a harmonization of the academic interest
in diversity admissions and constitutional mandates. The brief tracks
Justice Powell's opinion in many respects - including his employment
[Vol. 32:4
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of subsidiarity themes. But the Law School declined to follow Justice
Powell's lead in one important respect. In support of its mission, the
Law School did not rely on an argument grounded in the First
Amendment. Instead, the Law School argued the need for flexibility
in applying the Equal Protection Clause and for deference to its
educational mission as a subsidiary institution - without resort to
grounding this mission in the First Amendment. Also of great
importance was the fact that the Law School argued that its particular
educational mission includes both diversity and selectivity as an elite
institution. Selectivity became an issue in the Grutter litigation but
was not given explicit consideration in Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion. Nevertheless, the Law School, on the basis provided by
Justice Powell, was able to argue that its dual interest in diversity and
selectivity served the common good.
Pursuing further the academy's deployment of subsidiarity-style
arguments, Part V examines certain amicus briefs filed in support of
the Law School.29 Attention is focused on three briefs filed by
academic groups employing subsidiarity concepts and concerns. The
amicus brief of a self-selected group of law school deans is of special
interest because, perhaps more than any other brief filed in the case,
it presents the most concentrated set of arguments employing a broad
range of the subsidiarity themes outlined in Part II. And of particular
importance in the context of the Grutter litigation, this brief follows
Justice Powell's lead and departs from the Law School's brief in
arguing for the First Amendment as protective of academic
autonomy. As we will see, the Grutter Court relies, in part, on such
an argument in deciding in favor of the Law School.
Also considered in Part V are the amicus briefs filed by Amherst
College (in conjunction with a group of other highly selective
academic institutions) and by the American Law Deans Association.
Amherst's brief is of interest because, as did the Law School,
Amherst argued for selectivity in admissions as important to the
mission of elite academic institutions in service to the common good.
Amherst also argued that judicial deference to the educational
judgment of selective academic institutions supports reaffirmation of
Justice Powell's conclusion, that diversity constitutes a compelling
interest. The brief of the American Law Deans Association is of
29. See Robert P. George, Gratz and Grutter: Some Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1634, 1635 (2003) ("The list of amici curiae urging the Court to uphold racial and
ethnic preference policies was extraordinary.... The Establishment left the Justices in no
doubt as to where the mainstream of elite opinion stood on the matter.").
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interest because while it too argued for selectivity, unlike the Law
School it argued that selectivity in admissions constitutes a separate
compelling interest (in addition to diversity) under equal protection
analysis. This is noteworthy because some of the dissenters in Grutter
argued that the Court should have determined whether the Law
School's interest in selectivity (which the Law School argued was
integral to its mission) constituted a compelling interest. The Deans
Association also argued that selective law schools have a compelling
interest in avoiding resegregation that would result from a decision
adverse to the Law School. The Association predicted that, in such
an event, law schools would lose legitimacy because the public would
view law schools as segregated. While the Grutter Court does not
accept avoidance-of-resegregation as a separate compelling interest,
the Court does rely importantly on the legitimacy point in accepting
diversity as a compelling interest.
Part VI examines the Supreme Court's opinion in Grutter in light
of the subsidiarity arguments reflected in Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion and in the briefs of the Law School and its amici. The Grutter
Court agrees with the importance Justice Powell attributed to the
academic mission and adopts his conclusion that diversity constitutes
a compelling interest in the context of university admissions. The
Court also follows Justice Powell in grounding academic autonomy in
the First Amendment (in accord with the argument of the deans who
signed the Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al., ("the Individual
Deans")). But as in Justice Powell's opinion, the Grutter Court's
invocation of the First Amendment does not preclude the Court from
addressing subsidiarity concerns. Most importantly, the Court goes
on to consider the contributions that the academy renders to the
common good. In this regard, the Court takes into account an
element of the academic mission (selectivity) that was not explicit in
Justice Powell's Opinion. The Court finds that the Law School's dual
mission of diversity and selectivity serves the common good in
important ways, which include (as suggested by the Law School and
by the American Law Deans Association) public perception of the
legitimacy of selective institutions that provide an educational
pathway to leadership positions.
I. The Traditional Meaning Of Subsidiarity
According to the philosopher John Finnis, the principle of
subsidiarity has its source in the fact that "[h]uman good requires not
only that one receive and experience benefits or desirable states; it
requires that one do certain things, that one should act, with integrity
[Vol. 32:4
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and authenticity; if one can obtain the desirable objects and
experiences through one's own action, so much the better."3 ° Because
of the danger that the political order or intermediary associations may
stifle individual self-constitution, the principle
... affirms that the proper function of association is to help the
participants in the association to help themselves or, more
precisely, to constitute themselves through the individual
initiatives of choosing commitments (including commitments to
friendship and other forms of association) and of realizing these
commitments through personal inventiveness and effort in
projects (many of which will, of course, be co-operative in
execution and even communal in purpose)."'"
Subsidiarity informs not only the relationship between an
individual and an association of which he may be a member. In the
context of multiple layers of larger and smaller associations, the
subsidiarity principle, as stated by John Paul II in the encyclical
Centesimus annus, requires that "a community of a higher order
should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower
order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it
in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities
of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good."32
Accordingly, "neither the state nor any larger society should
substitute itself for the initiative and responsibility of individuals and
intermediary bodies."33
John Paul II's reference to the common good is significant. In
the political order, we are dealing, in Finnis' words, with "the most
complex common good, which (subject to the principle of
subsidiarity) excludes no aspect of individual well-being and is
potentially affected by every aspect of every ife-plan."4 Unanimity
here is a practical impossibility. As a result, in order to respect the
initiative and responsibility of individuals and intermediary
associations, subsidiarity "sets limits for state intervention" and,
where possible, "aims at harmonizing the relationships between
30. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 147 (1980) (emphasis in
original). "[O]ne who is never more than a cog in big wheels turned by others is denied
participation in one important aspect of human well-being." Id.
31. Id. at 146.
32. Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 1883 (2000) (quoting Centesimus annus
48 § 4).
33. Id. at para. 1894.
34. FINNIS, supra note 30, at 233.
35. Id.
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individuals and societies.,
36
Respect is particularly due where a subsidiary body such as the
family or a university takes the initiative and assumes responsibility
for an undertaking pursuant to its "mission." John Paul II has stated
that education is a mission entrusted in the first place to parents but
that parents "share their educational mission with other individuals or
institutions, such as the Church and -the State."37  Nevertheless,
despite the fact that the family does not have exclusive responsibility
for education, John Paul II cautions that "the mission of education
must always be carried out in accordance with a proper application of
the principle of subsidiarity. '3 8 As Finnis explains, "individuals and
particular groups (this family, this firm, this university, this
government department...) should have a certain autonomy, a
certain prior concern and responsibility for their own particular good,
their own particular interests or specialty."39
Nevertheless, as stated in Centesimus annus, subsidiarity applies
"always with a view to the common good."' Accordingly, subsidiarity
does not issue a blank check to individuals and intermediary
associations. One must always be wary, as Finnis observes, that
"intelligence and dedication- to the common good [may be] mixed
with selfishness and folly."'4' Thus, it must be kept in mind that the
"concern of particular persons and groups for individual goods, for
particular common goods and for particular aspects of the over-all
common good, will enhance the over-all common good only if the
resulting particular options are subject to some degree of co-
ordination., 42  Accordingly, subsidiarity does not eliminate the
responsibility of the political order to achieve proper coordination.
Indeed, "the law may, for good reasons, nullify" the acts of
individuals and associations consistent with its "moulding, subsidiary
function" of assisting them in promoting the common good.43
36. Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 1885.
37. John Paul II, Letter to Families § 16 (emphasis added).
38. Id. (emphasis omitted).
39. FINNIS, supra note 30, at 233 (ellipsis in original, emphasis added).
40. Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 32.
41. FINNIS, supra note 30, at 233.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 292 n.3. With respect to this cautionary point, it is must be noted further
that in Finnis' view, much of what is often termed individual "rights" are not a
counterweight to, but part of the common good. Indeed, as noted above, the subsidiarity
principle is grounded in the fundamental need to respect the integrity and authenticity of
individual self-constitution. Id. at 147. As Finnis says, "[a]n attempt, for the sake of the
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In sum, the principle of subsidiarity requires due respect for sub-
political communities in the exercise of their proper functions when
they take the initiative and assume responsibility in pursuit of the
self-constitution of their members, "particular common goods and for
particular aspects of the over-all common good."' In this respect,
communities such as universities "should have a certain autonomy, a
certain prior concern and responsibility for their own particular good,
their own particular interests or specialty." 5  Higher authorities
should avoid interfering in communities exercising their functions and
should assist communities and attempt to harmonize their activities
with a view to the common good. But even where the activity of
communities is based on a concern "for particular aspects of the over-
all common good," this activity will be subject to the subsidiary,
coordinating function of law.
H. Subsidiarity and the Courts in the American Constitutional Context
As we have seen, subsidiarity is typically discussed in the
literature as a principle intended to inform the actions of a law-
making authority such as a legislature when confronted with the
impact its contemplated action may have on institutions subject to its
authority. In such a case, the subsidiarity principle counsels that a
higher-order legislature ought not to impose a mandate that, while
within this legislature's authority, nevertheless significantly disables a
subsidiary body (lower-order legislature or other institution or
community) from using its expertise or knowledge in service to the
common good.
My interest here, however, is in subsidiarity as a consideration
and constraint reflected in court opinions. In the United States
context, subsidiarity might be embodied - at least to some degree - in
an explicit provision of the Constitution. A likely candidate for such
a role would be the Tenth Amendment, which states that "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."' In the article discussed above, Professor Bermann
common good, to absorb the individual altogether into common enterprises would ... be
disastrous for the common good, however much the common enterprises might prosper."
Id. at 168. Thus, the common good cannot be evaluated apart from individual rights, with
the latter constituting only a factor to be subtracted or weighed, in some purported
utilitarian calculus. Id. at 210-18.
44. Id. at 233.
45. Id.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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has argued that while certain Supreme Court opinions reflect some
evidence of subsidiarity concerns,47 neither the Tenth Amendment's
text, nor the overall import of its interpretation by the Supreme Court
provides strong support for the Amendment as an embodiment of
subsidiarity.48
Bermann's argument seems persuasive, 9 and in any event, I have
no interest in challenging it here or in examining the extent to which
explicit provisions of the United States Constitution may embody or
reflect subsidiarity concerns. The main point I want to argue is that
the Supreme Court's decisions in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke" and in Grutter v. Bollinger reflect the
subsidiarity principle. In this section, I will explore what a judicial
concern for subsidiarity in the traditional sense (and not restricted to
Bermann's focus on the form of the principle as embodied in
European Community law) would look like in cases not governed by
a constitutional provision that arguably embodies the subsidiarity
principle, and in which a court must apply a constitutional provision
that explicitly limits a subsidiary institution, as in Bakke and Grutter.,
In such a situation, subsidiarity, if it applies, cautions that a court, in
interpreting a broad constitutional provision52  should avoid
interpreting the constitutional provision in a way that intrudes upon a
subsidiary body's ability to utilize its experience and knowledge in
limited areas covered by the provision - at least where there are
convincing reasons against rigid enforcement of the provision in a
context within the subsidiary body's expertise.
47. Bermann, supra note 5, at 418-21.
48. Id. at 418-23. But see Kennedy, supra note 22, at 79 (arguing that Justice
Thomas's dissent in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton embodied a view of the Tenth
Amendment that reflects the principle of subsidiarity).
49. See Gardbaum, supra note 21, at 835 (concluding that "[i]n a straightforward
sense, Bermann is obviously correct that subsidiarity is not a recognizable principle of
constitutional law in the United States, in that congressional exercise of concurrent powers
is not currently understood to be subject to legal constraint on federalism grounds"). But
Gardbaum argues for a new model of federalism whose constitutional grounding would be
in the Necessary and Proper Clause, rather than in the Tenth Amendment or in a
restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the latter two being the options
explored by Bermann. Id. at 836.
50. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
51. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
52. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1960) (emphasis added) ("[I]n
dealing with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an
interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based
on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out
of context in disregard of variant controlling facts.").
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However, it is important to acknowledge a difference in the
rights and responsibilities between a legislature and a court in these
two situations. A legislature could choose not to impose a mandate at
all when persuaded that doing so would stultify subsidiary bodies with
little or no net benefit to the end served by the proposed law.53 Or the
legislature could provide an exemption for, or otherwise
accommodate, subsidiary bodies."4 In the constitutional context, on
the other hand, the constitutional provision is already enacted. A
court's discretion is thus much more limited than the legislature's.
Confronted with a case brought before it, the court's duty is to apply
the law. 5  The problem is particularly serious where the law explicitly
restricts subsidiary institutions (such as state governments) in order to
prevent misuse of institutional power that harms the constitutional
rights of individual persons.56  Any relief granted to the subsidiary
must be harmonized 57 in some way with individual rights. Thus,
where - as is the case in the subject of this paper - a court must
interpret a constitutional provision that restricts state power to
protect individual rights, the court's ability to accord deference to a
subsidiary body subject to such restriction will be greatly limited.
If the subsidiarity principle is to be acknowledged in such a
situation, a convincing case would first have to be made that the
subsidiary body has an important work or mission that serves the
common good in a way that bears on the constitutional provision.
The case for some form of accommodation would be strengthened if
the subsidiary body is an institution whose members have
acknowledged expertise as to how this mission is to be achieved. And
this mission and expertise must bear upon the matter to be
53. See Bermann, supra note 5, at 414; Currie, supra note 16, at 361. James L.
Buckley, a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, has said that when he was a
member of the United States Senate, he "would consciously apply the rule of subsidiarity,
which predates the Constitution, in deciding whether a particular responsibility was
appropriate for the federal government." James L. Buckley, Reflections on Law & Public
Life, 1 GREEN BAG 391, 396 (1998).
54. See Currie, supra note 16, at 362-363. See also Bermann, supra note 5, at 414
(exploring such self-imposed Congressional restraints).
55. See Buckley, supra note 53, at 396 (noting that while, in accordance with the
subsidiarity principle, he "favor[s] returning to the states exclusive authority over all
matters that can be effectively handled at a state or local level," he is bound by the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which precludes a lower court from
enacting the subsidiarity principle).
56. As for example and of particular interest below, through the Fourteenth
Amendment's restriction against State violation of the equal protection of the laws. The
academic institutions involved in Bakke and Grutter are state institutions.
57. See FINNIS supra at note 35.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
adjudicated. In a court opinion acknowledging this, one would expect
to see the court invoking a principle of constitutional interpretation
that "context" is important in applying the law to the subsidiary
body. 8 One would also expect to see an argument that space must be
accorded for the subsidiary to exercise some appropriate "discretion"
in the way in which its mission will be accomplished. And one would
expect a court to show concern about judicial "interference" in the
work of the subsidiary body or about "rigid" application of the
constitutional provision that would "force" the subsidiary to abandon
its own judgment. Nevertheless, because the constitution explicitly
limits the authority of the subsidiary and protects individual rights,
one would expect that any deference accorded to the subsidiary
would not be absolute but would be conditional in nature and subject
to some form of court scrutiny.
The case in favor of deference would, of course, be greatly
strengthened if the court could invoke a constitutional provision,
aside from the one primarily at issue, that was protective of the
subsidiary body. The force of this other constitutional law would be
"countervailing" to the law restricting the subsidiary. 9 Nonetheless,
for the reasons noted immediately above, one would expect that any
protection or "autonomy" accorded to the subsidiary by this other
constitutional law would not be unconditional.
Given the above, what we would expect to see in Bakke and
Grutter, if the Court followed such an approach, would be that the
Court, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, would be sensitive
to applying the Clause in the higher education context where
educational authorities had taken the initiative to act in accordance
with their mission and in good faith attempted to comply with the
law. The Court would acknowledge the mission and expertise of the
institution and accord deference, where appropriate, with respect to
the institution's judgment relating to matters within its mission and
expertise. It would also be helpful, of course, if the Court could
invoke another constitutional law protective of the university, but
because of the concerns mentioned above, this help will not be in the
form of a blank check. As we will see, this pattern is reflected in
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and in the majority opinion in
Grutter.
58. See Gomillion, supra note 52.
59. As we will see below, the Supreme Court in Bakke and Grutter found the First
Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause to constitute such a countervailing principle in
the context of the litigation in those cases.
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Il. Justice Powell's Opinion in Bakke
In the words of a Justice who participated in the Supreme
Court's decision in the case, Bakke "aroused more interest in the
Nation, the press, and the Bar than any I have seen in my [] terms on
the Court."' 6 The case "raised the most important question of race
relations since Brown v. Board of Education and the most divisive.",
61
The Supreme Court's decision would "fix[] the future of racial
preferences, and [Justice] Powell's was the decisive view." 62 At issue
in Bakke was the special admissions program of the medical school of
the University of California at Davis ("the University"), which sought
to reserve sixteen of the 100 places in the first year class to certain
designated minorities, including African-Americans.63 Allan Bakke, a
white applicant denied admission to the medical school, challenged
the school's admissions program in California state court on the
ground that it discriminated against non-minority applicants in
violation of the federal Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, and the California State Constitution."' The trial
court ruled that the program violated Title VI and the federal and
state constitutions and that the University could not take race into
account in its admissions decisions." That court also found, however,
that Bakke had not shown that he would have been admitted but for
discriminatory admissions procedure and so it denied his plea for
admission.6 On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the
University's special admission program violated the Equal Protection
Clause (without deciding on the Title VI or state constitutional
claims), and the court enjoined the University from considering race
in the future in its admissions programs.67 Upon the University's
concession that it could not meet the burden the California Supreme
Court set for it to prove, that Bakke would not have been admitted
even in the absence of the University's special admissions program,
60. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
SUPREME COURT 1 (1988) (brackets in original). The Justice quoted remains anonymous
in Prof. Schwartz's account.
61. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: A BIOGRAPHY 456 (1994).
62. Id. at 456-57.
63. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978).
64. Id. at 277-78.
65. Id. at 279.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 279-80.
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the court ordered Bakke to be admitted.6' This order was stayed by
the U.S. Supreme Court pending its review of the case.69
The United States Supreme Court accepted the appeal but was
unable to form a single majority on all issues before it.7" Justice
Powell agreed with the University on the general point that student
body diversity could constitute a compelling interest supporting an
admissions program.7  But he found the University's special
admissions program unconstitutional because it excluded from
consideration non-favored applicants, even if they possessed the
potential to contribute to educational diversity, from competing for
the positions in the special admissions program.72  Justice Powell
disagreed, however, with the California Supreme Court's judgment
that the University could not consider race as a factor in its
admissions decisions in the future.73  Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun found the University's admissions program
permissible under the Constitution and Title VI on the ground that
the government can take race into account to "remedy disadvantages
cast on minorities by past racial prejudice. 7 4 They joined Justice
Powell to form a five-vote majority reversing the California Supreme
Court's injunction forbidding the University from taking race into
account in future admissions programs.75 Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist found that the admissions
program violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.76  These
Justices joined with Justice Powell to form a five-vote majority
striking down the University's special admissions program. Thus,
although Justice Powell was in a minority of one in rejecting the
special admissions program on a narrower basis than those joining
him in this rejection and in approving race consideration on a
narrower basis than those who joined him in such approval, his
77
opinion was the decisive opinion in the case.
68. Id. at 280-81.
69. 429 U.S. 953 (1976).
70. For an account of Justice Brennan's opposition to accepting the appeal (in which
view he was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall and Blackmun), see
SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 41-42.
71. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
72. Id. at 319-20.
73. Id. at 320.
74. Id. at 325-26.
75. Id. at 326.
76. Id. at 421.
77. Justice Powell considered his opinion in Bakke the most important of his
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A. The University's Justification of Its Special Admissions Program
According to the account provided in Justice Powell's opinion,
the University offered four purposes in support of its special
admissions program.8 The first purpose, "reducing the historic deficit
of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the
medical profession,"7 9 was construed by Justice Powell as an attempt
by the University "to assure within its student body some specified
percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic
origin."' So construed, this purpose was tersely dismissed by Justice
Powell as "facially invalid" because "[p]referring members of any one
group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination
for its own sake" forbidden by the Constitution." This goal
presumably would be forbidden to any governmental body or
institution, whether subsidiary or not.
Justice Powell's analysis of the other two goals he rejected is of
particular importance here because his analysis relies on limitations
on a subsidiary body as defined by its particular mission. The
University argued that its program was needed to counter the effects
of "societal discrimination., 82  Justice Powell first observes that
"'societal discrimination' [is] an amorphous concept of injury that
may be ageless in its reach into the past. 83  More significantly for
present concerns, Justice Powell insists that remedying discrimination
is only a legitimate goal when proper findings of violations of law
have been made by governmental entities having authority to do so.
84
The Supreme Court, Justice Powell states, has "never approved a
opinions. SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 1; JEFFRIES, supra note 61, at 456.
78. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-06.
79. Id. at 306 (quoting the Brief for Pet'r [the University], Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811) (June 7, 1977), 1977 WL 189474, at 32).
80. Id. at 307.
81. Id.; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (stating that Justice
Powell rejected this interest as, in the Grutter majority's words, "an unlawful interest in
racial balancing.").
82. Id. at 306. In its brief, the University placed heavy emphasis on the goal of
redressing societal discrimination and its lingering effects. The University's brief twice
uses the phrase "societal discrimination," Brief for Pet'r, 1977 WL 189474, at 3 and 21, and
argues for the need to counter "generations of pervasive discrimination," id. at 2, "the
legacy of past racial discrimination;" id. at 9, "previous pervasive discrimination," id. at
13, "the legacy of past discrimination," id. at 19, "the persistent effects of past
discrimination," id. at 28, "the lingering effects of past discrimination," id. at 59, "lingering
and negative color awareness," id. at 60, and "the effects of past discrimination," id. at 78.
83. Id. at 307.
84. Id.
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classification that aids persons as members of relatively victimized
groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of
judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or
statutory violations., 85 This is not simply an historical accident of the
cases that have come before the Court because there are compelling
reasons why such action by authorized bodies is necessary.6 After
articulating these reasons, Justice Powell concludes that the
University was "in no position to make[] such findings." '
In this context, Justice Powell makes his first reference to the
University's "mission," which as we have seen can be an important
concept in subsidiarity analysis. While he will go on to refer this
mission in a more positive manner,8 here his reference to mission is
restrictive. The University, Justice Powell says, was not competent to
make the necessary findings because "[i]ts broad mission is education,
not the formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of
particular claims of illegality." 9  Such tasks are reserved to
appropriate governmental bodies; "isolated segments of our vast
governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions,
at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively
determined criteria."'  "To hold otherwise," Justice Powell says,
"would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of
legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation
could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as
victims of societal discrimination. '" 9' Thus, as a subsidiary body whose
mission is education, the University lacked "the authority and
capability" to enact, adjudicate, and enforce the remedial goal it
invoked.'
The University had also invoked the goal of increasing the
number of physicians who would practice in underserved
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 307-09.
87. Id. at 309.
88. Id. at 313.
89. Id. at 309.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 310; see also the Grutter majority's observation that "Justice Powell rejected
an interest in remedying societal discrimination because such measures would risk placing
unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties 'who bear no responsibility for whatever
harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered."'
539 U.S. at 323-24 (quoting 438 U.S. at 310).
92. Id. at 309-10.
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communities.93 Unlike his categorical rejection of the remedial goal,
Justice Powell did not reject this goal as outside the competence of
the University and beyond the scope of its mission as an educational
institution.94 Instead, he agreed with the California Supreme Court's
judgment that "there are more precise and reliable ways" than racial
classification of applicants that the University could have employed
"to identify applicants who are genuinely interested in the medical
problems of minorities." 95 He concluded that the University "has not
carried its burden of demonstrating that it must prefer members of
particular ethnic groups over all other individuals in order to promote
better health-care delivery to deprived citizens. ' Nor, in fact, did it
show that "its preferential classification is likely to have any
significant effect on the problem."' So here, the problem was not
with the goal that the subsidiary institution sought to promote.
Justice Powell did not suggest that this goal was beyond the scope of
the University's mission or its competence. Rather, the University
simply failed to show that the means it chose was necessary - or even
effective - in achieving that goal.98
Of greatest significance for this paper and for the subsequent
case of Grutter v. Bollinger was the University's reliance on student
body diversity as a goal of its special admissions program.' The
treatment of this goal in Bakke is noteworthy. By contrast, while
Justice Powell did not dismiss as such the goal of aiding underserved
communities, he did not discuss this goal extensively or draw any
conclusions about its constitutional significance, finding simply that
the University had not shown that racial classification was necessary
93. Id. at 306. For the University's argument, see Brief for Pet'r, 1977 WL at 25:
"many forces, including economics, idealism, and continuing patterns of discrimination,
commonly bring minority physicians back into minority communities." See also id. at 33:
"the Davis program may prompt more white physicians to practice in minority
communities."
94. See the Grutter majority's observation that Justice Powell "conclud[ed] that even
if such an interest could be compelling in some circumstances the program under review
was 'not geared to promote that goal."' 539 U.S. at 324 (quoting 438 U.S. at 310).
95. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311 (quoting the California Supreme Court's opinion, 18 Cal.
3d 34, 56 (1976)).
96. Id. at 311.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 310-11.
99. See the Grutter majority's observation that "Justice Powell approved the
university's use of race to further only one interest: 'the attainment of a diverse student
body."' 539 U.S. at 324 (quoting 438 U.S. at 311).
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to promote it. '°° Although he will also find that the manner chosen by
the University to promote diversity was deficient,"1 he nevertheless
engages in an extended discussion affirming that diversity - properly
understood - is not only an institutionally appropriate goal for the
University but can constitute a compelling governmental interest" 2
In the course of conducting this analysis, Justice Powell enunciated
principles that are crucial to the arguments briefed in Grutter and to
the Grutter opinion.
B. The Diversity Goal and Subsidiarity
Justice Powell's discussion of student body diversity sounds
several of the themes identified in Parts I and II, above, on the role of
a subsidiary institution. Of these, the concepts relied on in the
opinion are the University's "mission"' 3 (phrased also as the
"business" of the University)," its service to the common good,1 5 the
proper "context" for assessing the meaning of equal protection, ' 16 the
appropriate "discretion" to be accorded to the subsidiary
institution, ' ° and the concern to avoid "judicial interference" in the
work of the subsidiary institution. ' ' There is also reliance on another
constitutional principle (the First Amendment) protective of the
subsidiary institution."
Justice Powell's description of the diversity goal is stated in a way
that places it squarely within the responsibility, competence, and
expertise of an educational institution. This goal is identified in
Justice Powell's opinion as "obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from an ethnically diverse student body."" ° But Justice Powell
100. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311.
101. Id. at 320.
102. Id. at 314.
103. Id. at 313.
104. Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J. concurring)).
105. Id. at 312, 314.
106. Id. at 314.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 319, n.53.
109. Id. at 312-14.
110. Id. at 306. The University's brief on this point reads: "obtaining the educational
and societal benefits that flow from racial and ethnic diversity in a medical school student
body." Brief for the Pet'r, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 78-811), 1977 WL 189474, at
32. Note that Justice Powell drops from the University's brief the references to "racial
diversity" and to "societal benefits." These omissions may be due to Justice Powell's
effort to make race merely one component of diversity and to focus on the university's
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does not rest with a mere statement of the propriety of this goal for
an educational institution (as he might have done were he simply
applying the subsidiarity principle). Instead, he immediately resorts
for support to the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause as
protective of "academic freedom" and states that "though not a
specifically enumerated constitutional right," academic freedom
"long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment.'. 1  Justice Powell immediately follows this with the
statement that "[t]he freedom of a university to make its own
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student
body."1
2
In support of this claim about academic freedom, Justice Powell
quotes Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire."3 In the passage quoted, Justice Frankfurter himself
quoted a passage from a text entitled "The Open Universities in
South Africa," which refers to the mission ("the business") of a
university as providing an "atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation.""' According to the authors
quoted, this atmosphere is constituted by the presence of a
university's "four essential freedoms,"'"5 which recognize the initiative
and responsibility of a university "to determine for itself on academic
grounds... who may be admitted to study." 6  Of course, Justice
Powell will go on to state that although diversity is an "academic
ground" that admission committees may consider, a university's First-
Amendment based freedom to use diversity in determining who may
be admitted to study is not absolute. 7  Nevertheless, through his
invocation of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy,
educational mission, rather than its societal goals.
111. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. In a prior draft circulated as a memorandum to the other
Justices, Justice Powell appends to this reference to academic freedom the clause "though
not a constitutional right in itself." SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 217. This clause is
replaced in the final draft by the clause "though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right." The change appears to reflect a concern to state that academic
freedom is a constitutional right, although not a specifically enumerated one.
112. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1967)). Justice Powell
puts internal quotation marks around the passage that Justice Frankfurter quotes, but he
does not mention the source of this internal quote.
115. This phrase is an internal quote (source not identified) in the passage from The
Open Universities text quoted by Justice Frankfurter.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 319-20.
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Justice Powell has placed a university's admissions decisions in the
context of a First Amendment freedom. 118
It is especially noteworthy that Justice Powell's resort to the First
Amendment - which because of its constitutional significance as
protective of liberty, could conceivably have resolved the diversity
issue without further discussion - does not lead him to conclude in
short order in favor of the University. Of particular importance for
present concerns, the argument that he goes on to articulate relies on
points that are significant for subsidiarity. Most importantly, Justice
Powell's discussion of the constitutional "concern" for academic
freedom is notable for its emphasis on the contribution that
universities make to the common good. Already present in the
quotation Justice Powell reproduces from Justice Frankfurter, which
Justice Powell invests with First Amendment authority, is the
suggestion that academic freedom is not valued for its own sake but
because it contributes to goods fostered by free discussion such as
"speculation, experiment, and creation." This suggestion gains force
when Justice Powell follows it with a quotation from the Court's
opinion in Keyshian v. Board of Regents,119 in which Justice Brennan
for the Court says that "[ojur Nation is deeply committed to
safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all
of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. 12. In other words, it
is because of this "transcendent value to all of us" that "[academic]
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment.,
121
This value to the nation is given specific meaning as Justice Powell
continues the quote from Keyshian: "The Nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather]
than through any kind of authoritative selection.",
122
Immediately following the above quote, Justice Powell adopts
118. For an analysis and criticism of Justice Powell's use of Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Sweezy, see Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom - A
Constitutional Misconception: Did Grutter v. Bollinger Perpetuate the Confusion?, 30 J.C.
& U.L. 531, 533-40 (2004). For a more favorable view and analysis of the Supreme Court's
cases invoking the First Amendment to protect academic freedom, see J. Peter Byrne,
Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern" of the First Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 251
(1989).
119. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
120. Id. at 312 (quoting Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603).
121. Id.
122. Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
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part of the language of Keyshian and adds a modification with
application to the matter before him, stating that "'the nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.'' 123 From
this proposition, he concludes that in arguing for the right to select
students who will contribute "the most to the 'robust exchange of
ideas ,.124 the University invoked "a countervailing constitutional
interest, that of the First Amendment."'25 Justice Powell immediately
adds that in seeking to admit students who will contribute the most to
the exchange of ideas valued by the First Amendment, the University
"must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission."'26
Further occasion for emphasizing academic freedom's
contribution to the common good is provided to Justice Powell when
he next considers a possible counterargument to his conclusion.
Confronting an argument that a university's First Amendment
interest may have less force with respect to graduate education where
professional competence arguably takes precedence over the robust
exchange of ideas, Justice Powell responds that the diverse
backgrounds of professional school students continues to contribute
to the common good served by professional schools. He quotes from
the Court's opinion in Sweatt v. Painter,' 27 where access to law school
education was at issue, to support his conclusion that "even at the
graduate level, our tradition and experience lend support to the view
that the contribution of diversity is substantial."'28 Because physicians
serve a heterogeneous community, a diverse student body in medical
school may "better equip its graduates to render with understanding
their vital service to humanity. ' 12 9  And "[glraduate admissions
decisions, like those at the undergraduate level, are concerned with
123. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (emphasis added) (quoting Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603).
Hiers, supra note 118, at 540, notes that "Keyshian, which Justice Powell cited as
authority, had nothing to say about student admissions programs or practices."
124. Id. at 313 (quoting Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603).
125. Id. As noted below, in its briefs the University did not make a First Amendment-
based argument relating to the "robust exchange of ideas." It did argue that "[a]s a result
of integrated education made possible by the Davis program, white students will develop
an enhanced awareness of the medical concerns of minorities and of the difficulties of
effective delivery of health care services in minority communities." Brief for the
Petitioner, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 78-811), 1977 WL 189474, at 33.
126. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
127. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
128. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added) (citing Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634).
129. Id. at 314.
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'assessing the potential contributions to the society of each individual
candidate following his or her graduation - contributions defined in
the broadest way to include the doctor and the poet, the most active
participant in business or governmental affairs and the keenest critic
of all things organized, the solitary scholar and the concerned
parent.".30
C. Justice Powell's Invocation of the First Amendment
Occasion must be taken here to remark on Justice Powell's
invocation of the First Amendment as protective of academic
freedom. If the University's freedom of speech was all that was
involved in this case, Justice Powell, upon invoking the First
Amendment, might well have concluded forthwith in favor of the
University without further exploration of the University's mission and
its contributions to society.' Instead, Justice Powell appears to view
the import of the First Amendment in this case not primarily as a
shield protecting the University against judicial or other outside
scrutiny but as supportive of values that are judicially cognizable and
that the academic world has promoted through its contributions to
the common good.32 Also noteworthy is that the First Amendment is
called upon to protect a government entity against an individual
complaining that his constitutional right has been
violated.'33Moreover, by virtue of the cases he quotes for support,
Justice Powell's invocation of the First Amendment nationalizes the
common good that universities serve. This is seen, for example, in his
use of the quotations from Keyshian, which state that "[o]ur Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which is of
transcendent value to all of us.. ." and that "It]he Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to [the] robust
exchange of ideas.. .""' As a result of this "nationalization," a state
university's contributions need not be focused on state or local
130. Id. at 314 n.49 (quoting William G. Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race,
Princeton Alumni Wkly., Sept. 26, 1977, at, 7, 10).
131. It is noteworthy that none of the other Justices participating in Bakke invoked the
First Amendment.
132. On this point, the reader should note Finnis's caution that the common good
ought not to be considered as a matter separate from protection of individual rights. See
supra note 30.
133. See Hiers, supra note 118, at 531 (noting, in criticism of Justice Powell, that "[t]he
First Amendment generally protects citizens from the actions of government, not
government from its citizens.")
134. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603).
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matters, but can extend to the common good of the nation.35 This
national focus and the Court precedents Justice Powell cites facilitate
judicial acknowledgement of the contributions of the academic
community and also facilitates a potential justification of affirmative
action that can be appreciated by the nation.
Still another reason why this invocation is noteworthy is that
nowhere in its brief, reply brief, or supplemental brief did the
University mention the First Amendment or mount an argument
based on constitutional protection of academic freedom.3 6 Indeed,
nowhere in its brief or reply brief does the University mention
"academic freedom." The single explicit reference to "academic
freedom" in the University's briefs occurs in its supplemental brief
devoted to the issue of whether Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
forbids the University's admissions program.'37 That reference is not
grounded in any reference to the First Amendment and occurs
toward the mid-way point of the supplemental brief where the
University asserts that a reading of Title VI that would "compel the
mandatory establishment of preferential admissions... . would cut
wide and deep into the freedom of the States to manage the affairs of
their institutions, and also into the academic freedom of all colleges
and universities whether privately endowed or State supported.' ' 38 So
the University's sole explicit reference to "academic freedom" is
made in support of the point that academic freedom is a barrier to
mandatory affirmative action.
The University's supplemental brief does invoke the "freedom"
and "autonomy" of states and academic institutions to voluntarily
adopt race-conscious remedial programs, but it invokes these values
in the context of arguing that neither Title VI nor the Equal
Protection Clause, in word or spirit, prohibits such programs. The
University argued that in interpreting Title VI, it must be kept in
mind that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause leaves State universities and
professional schools free, like private institutions, to adopt remedial
race-conscious admissions policies affording minorities more nearly
135. This nationalization will be especially important in Grutter, where the Court will
acknowledge the Law School's training of national leaders.
136. Rather than relying on autonomy, the University's principal emphasis was on the
need to redress the effects of past discrimination. See supra note 79.
137. The Supreme Court requested supplementary briefing on the statutory issue.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 434 U.S. 900 (1977)).
138. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 37, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811) (November 16, 1977) (emphasis added), 1977 WL 187997, at
37.
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equal access to higher education and the learned professions."1 39 The
University cautioned that "[f]or the Court to read subordinate
requirements relating to the details of admissions programs into Title
VI would impair the autonomy of educational institutions and of the
States in dealing with matters properly within their provinces and
thereby eliminate one of the great virtues of federalism as a source of
creativity in dealing with complex and subtle problems."44 In other
words, the University's argument was that this freedom exists because
the prohibitory scope of Title VI was not intended by Congress to
extend to educational affirmative action programs - not that the First
Amendment affirmatively protects such programs.
Nevertheless, the reference in the just-quoted statement to "the
autonomy of educational institutions and of the States in dealing with
matters properly within their provinces" does sound in subsidiarity
concerns. And in its opening brief, the University did make several
arguments grounded in subsidiarity. Most prominently, the
University argued that it and other academic institutions had
voluntarily taken the initiative to address a matter of social concern -
the effects of discrimination - by creating diversity admissions
programs.'4 1 Invoking the common good, the University argued that
these initiatives "flow[ed] from a broadened view of the public needs"
arising from the nation's history of discrimination. 1'2  The brief
asserted that these efforts were made pursuant to the educational
responsibilities of these institutions "in the exercise of their appointed
roles" and in accordance with their educational judgment.1 43 The
efforts arose from the experience and expertise of "educators [who]
have repeatedly been at the center of this country's efforts to grapple
with the disabilities historically imposed on persons because of their
color or ancestry."' 44 Further, the University sought acknowledgment
of the "wide scope of discretion' 15 that "the Fourteenth Amendment
leaves to the states in the realm of education. ' 6 And the University
139. Id. at 5.
140. Id. at 9.
141. Brief for Petitioner, at 9-11, 33-34, 42, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811)
(June 7, 1977), 1977 WL 187977.
142. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(9178) (No.76-811) (October 3, 1977), 1977 WL 187980, at 4. See also id. at 9. ("State
universities serve social purposes.")
143. For example, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 141 at 9, 40-42 and 43 n.53, 52, 76.
144. Id. at 41.
145. Id. at 75 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961).
146. Id. at 75. See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 143 at 63 (quoting Swann v.
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decried "judicial interventionism in the name of the federal
Constitution" by which the California Supreme Court "denied the
Davis faculty the right to pursue the ends of its choice."'' 7 But in its
briefs, the University did not make any argument explicitly based on
academic freedom as purportedly grounded in the First
Amendment.'48 The University's opening brief also does not rely on
an academic "autonomy" argument, although, in presenting its
argument grounded in the voluntary initiatives taken by academic
institutions, the University notes in passing that these initiatives
"sprang from a broad range of independent and autonomous sources"
and that "[n]o central authority directed this effort."'4 9
Perhaps related to the University's omission of an argument
based on the First Amendment is another omission in its briefs.
Nowhere in its opening brief, reply brief, or supplemental brief does
the University make an explicit, focused argument that its special
admissions program is central to its mission.5 ' In light of what Justice
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)) ("School authorities are
traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy
and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is
within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities.").
147. Id. at 83. See also id. at 13, where the University argues that reversal of the
opinion below would "allow educators, rather than lawyers and judges, to deal with
intractable matters of educational policy." And see id. at 14, where the University asserts
that the court below "exceeded the judicial function in substituting its judgment for that of
educators and for that reason alone must be reversed." And id. at 16 (Affirming the court
below "would certainly bring to the courts a continuous burden of supervision of the
admissions processes of the nation's professional schools."). And id. at 76 ("Intrusive
judicial review interferes drastically with the process of democratic government."). And in
its supplemental brief on the Title VI issue, the University asserted that "both wisdom and
inherited tradition caution against substituting a nationwide judge-made rule for pluralistic
decision-making through the educational self-government of both State and private
institutions, subject to revision by the political process if the people deem their interest to
require such revision." 1977 WL 187997, at 55.
148. The University's opening brief does quote Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Sweezy twice, the first time to support the proposition that "it is... irrelevant
to this Court how California chooses to distribute its governmental authority," id. at 76
(quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 256 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) and the second time for
Justice Frankfurter's statement about "the business of a university." Id. (quoting Sweezy,
354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
149. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). As noted above, supra note 147, in its Supplemental
Brief the University did invoke state and university "autonomy" as an area of freedom not
prohibited by Title VI.
150. There are no references to the academic mission in the University's Supplemental
Brief or Reply Brief, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (9178) (No.76-
811) (October 3, 1977), 1977 WL 187980. There are three references to one or more of a
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Powell says about the academic mission, these two omissions may be
seen as related. Only after he himself establishes the First
Amendment as a "countervailing constitutional interest" in favor of
the University does Justice Powell state that the University's diversity
admissions goal 5' is "of paramount importance in fulfillment of its
mission." Thus, Justice Powell's invocation of the First Amendment
provides the ground on which he makes prominent the University's
"mission," in a way that the University itself had not attempted.
Justice Powell's discussion of the First Amendment is also
notable because of the changes he made in a prior draft of his opinion
relating to this matter."' While most of the references discussed
above are also present in this prior draft, there are two interesting
changes, both of which strengthen the import of academic freedom.
In the draft, Justice Powell appends to his opening reference to
"academic freedom" the clause "though not a constitutional right in
itself."'53 In the opinion, this clause is replaced by the clause "though
not a specifically enumerated constitutional right."'54 While the prior
draft could be read as stating that academic freedom is not a
constitutional right, the final version suggests that it is, albeit not
specifically enumerated. Second, the opinion includes a two-sentence
paragraph that does not appear in the prior draft. This new
paragraph has (1) a sentence referring to academic freedom as "a
countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment"
and (2) a sentence that explicitly links this First Amendment interest
to the University's "mission":
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right
to select those students who will contribute the most to the "robust
exchange of ideas," petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional
interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light, petitioner must
be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission.'
medical school's manifold missions in its opening brief, but none of these is made to
support an argument that the special admissions program is crucial to the University's
academic mission. See Brief for Petitioner, 1977 WL 189474, at 30, 39, and 47.
151. Which he construes as selecting students who will "contribute the most to 'the
robust exchange of ideas"' valued by the First Amendment. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
152. For the prior draft, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, APPENDIX C 195-223.
153. SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 217.
154. Regents of the Univ. of CaL v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
155. Id. at 313.
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D. Other Subsidiarity Themes
The final draft of Justice Powell's opinion thus presents an
argument that university decisions such as admissions decisions
seeking a diverse student body enjoy some strong degree of First
Amendment protection accorded to the academic mission. His
argument to this point relates to the issue of the governmental
interest in a diversity admissions program. In the course of
transitioning to constitutional scrutiny of the means used to promote
this interest, Justice Powell sounds two subsidiarity themes discussed
in Parts I and II, above. The reference to both is made in clauses that
while acknowledging their importance, at the same time bespeak
limitation. He states that "[a]lthough a university must have wide
discretion in making the sensitive judgments as to who should be
admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may
not be disregarded."'56  And in addition to the importance of
discretion, Justice Powell also mentions the matter of context. "As
the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's
admissions program, the question remains whether the program's
racial classification is necessary to promote this interest."'57  These
statements acknowledge the importance of the school's discretion and
of context in constitutional interpretation, while noting that neither
absolves the program at issue from judicial scrutiny.
The limited import of context and of a university's discretion was
also suggested by what Justice Powell had said earlier in his opinion.
When rebutting the argument that the level of equal protection
scrutiny should vary in accordance with the race or ethnicity of the
person challenging a racially sensitive admissions program, Justice
Powell insisted that "[t~he guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
extend to all persons" regardless of race or ethnicity158 and that
"[r]acial distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
156. Id. at 314 (emphasis added). As we have seen, the University's brief also argued
for the importance of discretion. 1977 WL 189474, at 75. In its amicus brief in support of
the University, the Law School Admission Council also argued for judicial deference to
academic judgment: "[T]he basic values at stake [in the litigation] are educational, and the
responsibility rests with the educators to exercise their entrusted discretion reasonably and
fairly.... This extended analysis and debate [on affirmative action] has produced a broad
consensus among experts in legal education, reflecting a collective judgment worthy of
deference." Brief Amicus Curiae of the Law School Admission Council at 34-35, Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (9178) (No. 76-811) (June 7, 1977), 1977 WL
188017. Note that this passage also invokes the themes of expertise and of initiative and
responsibility.
157. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 289.
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for the most exacting judicial examination."' 59 Justice Powell stated
that to hold otherwise would be to "hitch[] the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause to... transitory considerations" and to "hold[], as
a constitutional principle, that judicial scrutiny of classifications
touching on racial and ethnic background may vary with the ebb and
flow of political forces."' This, according to Justice Powell, is
improper because "the mutability of a constitutional principle, based
upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances
for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to
the next, a critical feature of coherent interpretation.'.'.
This insistence on the importance of a consistent constitutional
standard in the face of "shifting political and social judgments"
undoubtedly puts limits on the role of context and discretion and
might also be thought to preclude the ability of a subsidiary
institution to make decisions that do not conform rigidly to the
constitutional standard. But Justice Powell goes on to state that
"[plolitical judgments regarding the necessity for the particular
classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance."'62  In
other words, while the constitutional standard remains the same, the
facts and judgments to which the standard applies may indeed be
"shifting." This proposition allows space to a university to employ
(time-bound) judgments with respect to a diversity admissions
program. Context and university discretion will be acknowledged,
but because the standard remains the same, university discretion will
remain subject to scrutiny.
Finally, when subsequently applying the second prong of equal
protection scrutiny, another subsidiarity theme is sounded when
Justice Powell expresses sensitivity to the issue of "judicial
interference" in the work of a university.' 6 This concern is consistent
with the fact that universities have taken the initiative and assumed
the responsibility to educate students in ways that contribute to the
common good. 64  After discussing what he considers as
159. Id. at 291.
160. Id. at 298.
161. Id. at 299 (citations omitted).
162. Id. (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
163. Id. at 319 n.53. As we have seen, the University also cautioned against "judicial
interventionism." Brief for Petitioner, 1977 WL 189474, at 83; see also Bakke, 438 U.S.. at
76.
164. As we have seen, the University's brief also seeks acknowledgment of the
initiative and responsibility that it and other academic institutions have assumed in
addressing discrimination's impact on education. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, 1977 WL
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constitutionally permissible forms of diversity-based admissions
programs, Justice Powell states with respect to racially sensitive
admissions decisions that "[s]o long as the university proceeds on an
individualized case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial
interference in the academic process."'65  Universities that employ
such individualized considerations will enjoy a "presumption of
legality," thus reducing their exposure to judicial interference.'
66
E. Conclusion
In conclusion, in Justice Powell's opinion the University is
presented as what may fairly be described as a subsidiary institution
entitled to judicial cognizance of its educational mission in service to the
common good. Justice Powell finds that the First Amendment provides
some freedom for the University's admissions decisions. This
"countervailing constitutional interest" creates a context in which the
requirements of the Equal Protection clause must be interpreted.
Nevertheless, invocation of the First Amendment does not prevent
Justice Powell from conducting an analysis that relies on certain concepts
central to the principle of subsidiarity - most importantly, the
University's educational mission. Accordingly, and responsive to
subsidiarity concerns, the University's discretion is recognized, and
judicial interference in University admissions decisions is to be avoided
when possible. But the University's acknowledged mission does not
create a blank check, and the First Amendment protection is not
absolute. Where a constitutional mandate is implicated, the University's
admissions goals will be examined for consistency with that mandate.
Goals that are outside the competence of the university cannot support
an admissions policy that challenges constitutional mandates. Goals that
are appropriate for the University's mission will be accorded proper
deference, but these goals will still be subject to some judicial scrutiny.
189474, at 9-11, 33-34, 40-42 and 43 n.53.
165. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n.53.
166. Id. In light of what will be discussed below in Grutter, it should be noted that
Justice Powell does not devote any special attention to the University's interest in the
selectivity of the university's admissions policies. Any issue as to selectivity would appear
to be encompassed with Justice Powell's quotation of the passage Justice Frankfurter
quotes in his concurring opinion in Sweezy, which mentions the university's freedom "to
determine for itself on academic grounds... who may be admitted to study." Bakke, 438
U.S. at 312. Thus, for Justice Powell - by way of his adoption of Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurring opinion - selectivity would appear to be an interest protected by the First
Amendment. This interest in selectivity does not appear to be an interest whose
constitutional weight (compelling or not) Justice Powell thinks needs to be recalculated in
the Equal Protection context.
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IV. The University of Michigan Law School's Brief in Grutter v.
Bollinger1
67
At issue in Grutter v. Bollinger, was a challenge to the race-
conscious admissions program of the University of Michigan Law
School ("the Law School"). In support of this program, the Law
School's brief invokes several of the subsidiarity themes outlined in
Parts I and II, above, and mentioned in Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion. The principal subsidiarity theme in the brief - and the one
most often and importantly relied on - is that the Law School has
taken the initiative and responsibility to assume an educational
mission in service to the common good. 68 The Law School argues
throughout its brief that crucial to its mission is a variety of
educational benefits flowing from a racially diverse student body.'69
As noted above, this theme plays a central role in Justice
Powell's opinion. It provided the basis for his conclusion that "the
attainment of a diverse student body... is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education. '',7° But in
Justice Powell's view, the University's subsidiary position also
precluded it from pursuing goals that were outside the scope of its
mission and competence."' The Law School's brief closely tracks
Justice Powell's conclusions in this regard and implicitly accepts that
Justice Powell's opinion has outlined a proper coordination of the
interest in diversity admissions with constitutional mandates."2 The
Law School accepts that "racial balancing" is an improper goal for a
university. 173 Following the tenor of Justice Powell's opinion, the Law
School acknowledges that a diverse student body must have
educational benefits for its students;' 4 admission of unprepared
167. Brief for the Respondent, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241),
2003 WL 402236.
168. The Law School's brief refers to the academic mission twenty times. Id. at *1, *2
(twice), *3, *4, *5, *13, *25 (twice), *28 (thrice), *29, *30 (twice), *33, *36, *37, and *50
(twice).
169. See especially Part I.C of the brief, where the Law School argues that these
benefits include teaching students " to bridge racial divides, work sensitively and
effectively with people of different races, and simply overcome the initial discomfort of
interacting with people visibly different from themselves . I..." d. at *25.
170. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
171. Id. at 309-310.
172. The Law School also makes an argument for reliance on Bakke based on the
plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992). See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *17-19.
173. Id. at *32.
174. Id. at *31-32.
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minority students for the sake of mere balancing would be
inconsistent with this purpose and thus with its educational mission.1
Again following Justice Powell's lead, the Law School also
explicitly declines to assert an interest in remedying "societal
discrimination,"'76 accepting that such an interest is improper for a
subsidiary institution because, in light of the breadth of the goal and
the limited scope of a subsidiary's authority, "no individual employer
or educational institution could hope to actually remedy societal
discrimination., 17  This mirrors (somewhat imperfectly) Justice
Powell's statement that "isolated segments of our vast governmental
structures are not competent to make [remedial] decisions, at least in
the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined
criteria,"' 78 although it omits the point Justice Powell made about the
need for findings by appropriate governmental bodies.
The other interest advanced by the University that Justice Powell
rejected as a constitutional justification for its admissions program
was the interest in educating physicians to serve underserved
communities.1 79 The Law School did not offer an equivalent interest
with respect to lawyers as an independent constitutional justification
of its admissions program. But the Law School did argue generally
that educating minority lawyers was important for the nation as part
of its argument that an elite professional school's diversity program
175. Id. at *32.
176. Lee Bollinger, President of the University of Michigan at the time of the
litigation, has acknowledged the constraint on the University's litigation strategy created
by Justice Powell's Bakke opinion (which, in Bollinger's words, "specifically precluded any
justification of using race and ethnicity as factors in admissions as a 'remedy' for past
societal discrimination"), while noting the difficulty "for higher education... that no one
really believed that the past could or should be ignored or that the present society is by
any means free of discrimination." Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v.
Bollinger, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1589, 1590-91 (2003). At one point in its brief, the Law
School in arguing for diversity speaks of "the elephant in the room - that ... America
remains both highly segregated by race and profoundly and constantly aware of its
significance in our society." Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *22-23.
177. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *31. At trial, the Chairperson of the
faculty committee that drafted the Law School's admissions policy testified that the
policy's "special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been
historically discriminated against" was based on an interest in the perspective of such
students and did not imply a goal of remedying past discrimination. See Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 319. And in its brief, the Law School argued that "America remains.., highly
segregated by race," and that there is still "widespread racial discrimination." Brief for the
Respondent, supra note 167, at *23.
178. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309.
179. Id. at 310-11.
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serves the common good.18° In its brief, the Law School repeatedly
argued that if its diversity admissions program were invalidated and it
chose not to lower its standards, "resegregation" of the school would
result. 8' And the Law School asserted that "a decision to overrule
Bakke would cut the minority lawyers currently being trained by half
or three-quarters, resulting in the near-complete absence of minority
students... that train most of our federal judges, prosecutors and law
clerks (to say nothing of the new lawyers at our country's leading law
firms). ,, "8
Despite citing such facts, the Law School did not argue that its
program was necessary to provide lawyers for underserved
communities. Instead, the Law School argued that "public
confidence in law enforcement and legal institutions.., will be
difficult to maintain if the segments of the bench and bar currently
filled by graduates of [elite law schools] again become a preserve for
white graduates, trained in isolation from the communities they will
serve." '83 Thus, what UC Davis argued surfaces to some extent, not as
an independent justification, but as part of the Law School's
argument that its admissions program benefits the common good in
ways that would be lost through an adverse ruling by the Court.
On the positive side, the Law School took to heart the
prominence Justice Powell gave to the concept of the academic
mission and reasserted his conclusion that diversity was a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education
in service to the common good. Accordingly, the Law School argued
in its brief that its diversity admissions program was an integral part
of its mission and that a diverse student body contributes in
significant ways to the common good.' On the one hand, the Law
School argued that admitting a diverse student body serves important
educational goals that would be realized for all its students - whether
minority or non-minority - while at school, such as breaking down
stereotypes and making students aware of the experiences and
viewpoints of their fellow students."8 Here, the Law School again
emphasized that these goals are not adventitious but are part of its
180. Id. at 312.
181. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167 at *1, *13, *19-20.
182. Id. at *20.
183. Id. at *20-21.
184. See, e.g., id. at *2, *8-9, *13, *25.
185. See, e.g., id. at *26, *30.
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mission as an educational institution.'86 This is so because "[t]he Law
School values the presence of minority students because they will
have direct, personal experiences that white students cannot -
experiences which are relevant to the Law School's mission." ' This
is important because "breaking down [racial] stereotypes is a crucial
part of its mission."'8 In addition, diversity in an elite (highly
selective) professional school would serve the common good after
graduation by preparing minority students - and non-minority
students educated in understanding the experiences of minority
students - to serve as lawyers and leaders of society and "the
Nation."1 9  The training of leaders of society through a highly
selective admissions program is "a core part of [the Law School's]
mission."19°
This last mentioned point relating to the Law School's elite status
and its preparation of leaders for the nation requires special note.
The Law School's brief explicitly introduces an element of its
admissions program that was at most implicit in Justice Powell's
consideration of the UC Davis program. 91 This is the element of
selectivity in admissions that the Law School as an academically elite
institution sought to preserve. Selectivity became an explicit issue in
the Grutter litigation because petitioner Grutter and the Solicitor
General, while acknowledging the legitimacy and educational benefits
of diversity, argued that to accord with the requirements of equal
protection, diversity must be achieved through alternative admissions
plans that arguably would have the effect of further relaxation of the
Law School's admissions standards.' 92 These arguments challenged
the school to justify its admissions program in light of its choice to be
an elite institution.
Because of these challenges, when the Law School in its brief
first mentions the diversity goal, it conjoins it with selectivity,
asserting that these goals are inextricably linked in its mission. Thus,
in the brief's statement of the case the Law School asserts that
186. "The presence of minority students," the brief asserts, is "essential to the Law
School's educational mission." Id. at *25.
187. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *30.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *2, *12, *20-21, *24-25.
190. Id. at *36.
191. See id. at *6.
192. This is the interpretation put on the arguments of Petitioner and the United States
by the Law School, see id. at *33-36, and by the Grutter Court, see 539 U.S. at 339-40.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
"academic selectivity and student body diversity, including racial
diversity, are both integral to the educational mission of the Law
School."' 93 And in the summary of argument section, the Law School
repeats that it "firmly believes that high academic standards and a
diverse student body are both integral to effective pursuit of its
chosen educational mission."'94 Throughout its brief, the Law School
repeatedly claims that invalidation of its admissions program will
"force" the school to choose between these goals, with adverse
consequences for its educational mission. '  Nevertheless, while
stressing the importance of selectivity as part of its mission, when the
brief offers an interest for the Court to find "compelling" for Equal
Protection review, it describes this interest in a unitary fashion as "the
limited, competitive consideration of race in admissions to secure the
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.
196
In addition to the emphasis on its educational mission serving the
common good, the Law School sounds other subsidiarity themes in its
brief. Particularly noteworthy is the caution expressed in the Law
School's brief against judicial interference in the academic mission.
This term is explicitly mentioned only once in the brief when the Law
School quotes Justice Powell's awareness of the problem of "judicial
interference in the academic process,''97 but the context is significant.
This reference occurs when the Law School addresses "[t]he difficulty
of measuring the precise weight given to race versus other diversity
factors."' 98 This theme is also stressed when, as noted above, the Law
School repeatedly asserts that judicial invalidation of its admissions
program will interfere in the Law School's academic judgment by
"forcing" the School to choose between the goals of selectivity and
diversity (both of which it argues are integral to its mission) and
raising the prospect of "resegregation" of elite universities.'w Indeed,
the Law School argued that racial diversity was "vitally important" to
its "core mission," thus emphasizing the severe disruptive effect of an
193. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *1 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at *13 (emphasis added); see also id. at *8-9, *49.
195. Id. at *1, *6, *13, *19-20, *33-38.
196. Id. at *14. (The quotation is from the first subheading in the brief's Argument
section.) In another references to this "compelling" interest, the brief describes it as the
"important educational benefits - for students and for the wider society - associated with a
diverse, racially integrated student body." Id. at *12.
197. Id. at *49 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n.53).
198. Id. at *49.
199. See supra note 195.
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adverse judicial decision.2
Related to the theme of judicial interference is the theme of
context in constitutional interpretation as opposed to rigid application
of constitutional law. As noted above, Justice Powell stated that "the
interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's
admissions program."20' In opposition to the proposition that the only
interest that could justify a university's race-sensitive admissions
program was remedying the university's own past discrimination, the
Law School argued that the Supreme Court "has steadfastly refused
to embrace a rigid interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.""2 2
The Law School pointed to situations in which the context clearly
indicates that a race-based choice of an employee would clearly be
justifiable, such as when an undercover law enforcement officer was
needed "to infiltrate a racially homogeneous terrorist cell.,
203
Another important subsidiarity theme present in the Law
School's brief is the argument for judicial recognition of university
autonomy and discretion. As with the theme of judicial interference,
however, this theme is only explicitly mentioned once. The reference
occurs towards the end of a section of the brief in which the Law
School argues that the Supreme Court's precedents, congressional
findings, and social science research confirm that racial diversity has
educational benefits. 2'  The brief asserts that the congressional
findings "reflect the longstanding conviction of the United States
government on a set of critically important issues of fact and national
policy." 25 The brief cites findings to support the propositions that
"America remains both highly segregated by race and profoundly and
constantly aware of its significance in our society" and that there are
significant differences in the lived experience of white and minority
students. °6  The brief goes on to cite testimony that for the
"classroom dynamic" with respect to racial issues, there is no
substitute for the presence of minority students.2 7
"Against this backdrop," the brief asserts, "law schools need the
200. Id. at *28-29 (emphasis added).
201. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15 (emphasis added).
202. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *27 (emphasis added).
203. Id. (citing Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
204. Id. at *21-25. In this passage, the brief does not cite the First Amendment or a
First Amendment case.
205. Id. at *22.
206. Id. at *23.
207. Id. at *24.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
autonomy and discretion to decide that teaching about the role of race
in our society and legal system, and preparing their students to
function effectively as leaders after graduation, are critically
important aspects of their institutional missions. ' ' 2"8 The Law School's
right to teach students about the role of race and prepare students for
leadership was not challenged in the litigation. However, presumably
relying on the "classroom dynamic" point mentioned immediately
above, the Law School builds on this premise to conclude that
"pursuit of those goals is greatly enhanced by the presence of
meaningful racial diversity among the law school's student body. ' '2°9
And the brief goes on to assert that "the presence of minority
students is also essential to the Law School's educational mission" of
"training lawyers and leaders" for American society.
210
Thus, the Law School's reference to "autonomy" starts with a
premise about one of its teaching goals - a goal that implicitly appeals
to academic freedom and the First Amendment (but see the following
paragraph). On this premise it constructs an argument for a diverse
student body as supporting that goal and for serving the common
good through outcomes (training leaders for a multi-racial society)
that are part of "national policy."
Although, as we have seen, the Law School relies on several of
the subsidiarity themes found in Justice Powell's opinion, there is one
important respect in which it declines to follow Justice Powell's lead.
Despite the fact that at one point in its brief the Law School quotes
part of the passages from Keyshian and from Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Sweezy that Justice Powell quoted in Bakke,t
unlike Justice Powell the Law School does not call attention to the
fact that these cases invoked the First Amendment."' Also, as noted
above, when the Law School makes its only explicit argument for
university "autonomy," it does not cite the First Amendment or any
208. Id. at *25 (emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at *28. The Law School's quote from Sweezy does not mention that the quote
is from Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion. See also id. at *29 n.44.
212. In neither of the passages from the Law School's brief referenced in the preceding
note does the Law School refer to the First Amendment or to Freedom of Speech. The
context of the first passage in which Keyshian and Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence is mentioned is an argument that diversity is essential to the Law School's
"mission." The reference to Keyshian and the Sweezy concurrence in footnote 44 of the
Law School's brief is made to support the proposition that the Supreme Court "has
recognized that universities have an unparalleled need for pluralism that is essential to the
vitality of our society." Id. at *29.
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First Amendment case in support.23
Indeed, nowhere in its brief does the Law School explicitly rely
on an argument grounded in the First Amendment or in academic
freedom. In fact, in a footnote the Law School cites favorably two
cases in which a First Amendment Freedom of Speech Clause
challenge was raised against a university."' The brief cites a post-
Bakke case, Board of Regents v. Southworth,215 in which University of
Wisconsin students argued that the university's compulsory student
activity fee forced them, in violation of their free speech rights, to
provide financial support to student groups whose expressive
activities they found repugnant."6 The Supreme Court substantially
denied the challenge, holding that the university's allocation of
funding was viewpoint neutral."7 The Law School's brief also cites
Healy v. James,"8 in which students brought a freedom-of-speech
challenge against Central Connecticut State College when the school
denied their petition for official campus recognition of a local chapter
of the Students for a Democratic Society.219
It would seem that in citing these cases, the Law School decided
to forego a First Amendment argument in favor of academic freedom
and chose instead to emphasize an argument in favor of context and
flexibility in the application of constitutional provisions. The brief
introduces these cases by stating that the Supreme Court "has
frequently held that constitutional doctrines must be flexible enough
to accommodate the unique needs of the educational environment.
20
The brief's parenthetical for the Southworth case reads as follows:
"First Amendment compelled-speech / funding doctrines modified for
academic environments., 22' The brief's parenthetical for the Healy
213. See Hiers, supra note 118, at 571 (noting that the Law School's argument for
academic freedom was based on policy grounds and not on the First Amendment), 573
("The Law School had not claimed any First Amendment or academic freedom
interest...").
214. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *29 n.43.
215. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
216. Id. at 226-27.
217. Id. at 233-34.
218. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
219. The Court reversed the lower federal court's decision in favor of the University
and remanded for further consideration. Id. at 194.
220. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *29 n.43 (emphasis added).
221. Id. The parenthetical's reference to the First Amendment is the only explicit
mention of the First Amendment in the brief, and it occurs in a context in which the
Amendment is employed against a university.
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case reads "student speech rights limited by 'the mutual interest of
students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free
from disruptive interference with the educational process.' ' 222 Thus,
both cases are cited for the point that a court should not rigidly apply
a constitutional provision where the context - especially one
involving a university - suggests that flexibility is appropriate. As
discussed in Part II, above, this adumbrates a cautious application of
the subsidiarity principle in the constitutional context. And because
the constitutional law in question is the Freedom of Speech Clause,
that clause is not available for support as a "countervailing
constitutional interest" in the way Justice Powell employed it in
Bakke. So, the Law School's argument here is, in effect, a naked
reliance (unsupported by a "countervailing constitutional interest")
on the university as a subsidiary institution serving the common good,
but with an appeal to the need for flexibility in constitutional
enforcement.
The Law School may have decided to rely on Southworth
because in that case the Court makes repeated favorable reference to
the academic mission,223 the subsidiarity concept on which the Law
School makes its principal reliance. And the Southworth Court
acknowledges that deference is due to a university's judgment in
pursuit of its mission.224 The Court states, for example, that in
considering the students' First Amendment challenge, "recognition
must be given as well to the important and substantial purposes of the
University, which seeks to facilitate a wide range of speech."225 The
Court adds that "[i]t is not for the Court to say what is or is not
germane to the ideas to be pursued in an institution of higher
learning, 226 and that "[t]he University may determine that its mission
is well served if students have the means to engage in dynamic
discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political
subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture
hall., 227 The Law School may also have determined that reliance on
Healy was beneficial because the Court, despite holding that the
College "failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment
principles," remanded the case for further consideration and stated
222. id.
223. 529 U.S. at 221 (twice), 223, 233.
224. Id. at 232, 233.
225. Id. at 231.
226. Id. at 232.
227. Id. at 233.
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that "First Amendment rights must always be applied 'in light of the
special characteristics of the.., environment' in the particular
case."
228
Thus, with respect to subsidiarity issues, the Law School placed
its greatest emphasis on its educational mission, which, it argued,
included both diversity and selectivity. And it argued that its pursuit
of this dual mission served the national common good in many ways,
perhaps most prominently, by training future national leaders. But
confronted with the option, on the one hand, of an encumbered
invocation of First Amendment protection of academic freedom and,
on the other hand, an argument for context and flexibility relying in
part on cases raising First Amendment challenges against a university,
the Law School chose the latter course.229 In making this choice, the
Law School implicitly pursued a course resting on the freedom of a
university as a subsidiary institution without support from a
"countervailing constitutional interest." It implicitly invited the
Grutter Court to take the same approach, emphasizing subsidiarity
without need for support from the First Amendment.23
V. Amicus Briefs in Support of the Law School in Grutter
A. Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. ("The Individual Deans'
Brief')23'
The Individual Deans' brief merits special attention because
perhaps more than any brief filed in Grutter, it makes the most
extensive and concentrated arguments invoking the subsidiarity
themes outlined in Part II and because it emphasizes a subsidiarity
theme not stressed by the Law School on which the Grutter Court
relied. Right at the outset of the brief, the Deans state their
fundamental thesis in a way that relies on several subsidiarity themes:
"universities and law schools should have the freedom to resolve [the
228. 408 U.S. at 194; id. at 180 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
229. See Hiers, supra note 118.
230. As we will see, the Court declined this invitation. Neither Southworth nor Healy
are cited by the Grutter Court.
231. Brief for Judith Areen et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 554398 (hereinafter Individual Deans' Brief). This
brief was signed by ten law school deans in their individual capacities, The law schools
were Georgetown, Duke, Pennsylvania, Yale, Columbia, Chicago, New York University,
Stanford, Cornell, and Northwestern. I refer to it here as "the Individual Deans' Brief" to
contrast it with the amicus brief filed by the American Law Deans Association, discussed
below.
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difficult and complex issues raised by the Grutter case] in ways that they
believe are most consistent with the academic and social missions of their
schools -- and not through rigid constitutionalization of the admissions
process by federal courts."'232 This sentence announces the major
subsidiary themes presented in the brief: (1) universities enjoy
constitutionally grounded freedom .(autonomy) and discretion to use
their judgment and expertise on matters within the scope of their
mission; (2) the mission of universities, as the brief will argue, serves the
common good;233 (3) academic freedom is threatened by judicial
interference in the academic process and mission; and, relatedly, (4) the
judiciary ought not to interpret constitutional law in a rigid way that is
insensitive to context and, as the brief will argue, disrupts justified
reliance on judicial precedent. And as implied in the Law School's brief,
the Individual Deans' brief argues that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion
sets forth an appropriate framework for coordinating and harmonizing
the activities of universities and the requirements of the Constitution.2
As the above summary indicates, the Deans emphasize the major
subsidiarity theme advanced in the Law School's brief: that
universities and law schools have a "mission" that serves the common
good.23 ' And the Deans agree that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion
sets forth a proper coordination of academic diversity programs and
constitutional mandates. As discussed below, there is one major
difference, however. Unlike the Law School's brief, the Deans' brief
makes academic autonomy salient, emphasizes its purported
constitutional basis, and repeatedly decries the danger posed to
autonomy by judicial interference.236
In pursuing these themes, the Deans divide their argument into two parts.
The first part argues that Justice Powell's major conclusions in Bakke legitimize
the Michigan Law School's admissions program and should be reaffrmed.237
The second part argues that reaffirmation of Bakke is especially appropriate
because of the constitutional protection of university autonomy.
238
232. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
233. Still in the argument summary, the brief says that "academic autonomy... not
only furthers the education of students, but also benefits society as a whole." Id. at *3.
234. Id. at *4-7.
235. The Individual Deans' Brief makes eleven references to the academic mission
(often speaking of an "educational and social mission"). Id. at *2, *3 (twice), *5 (quoting
the amicus brief of the United States), *7, *11 n.6, *17 (twice, once quoting John Yoo),
*19, *20, *22.
236. Id. at *3, *4, *5, *17, *19, *20, *21, *22, *24, *26.
237. Id. at *4-19.
238. Id. at *19-26.
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1. Part I of the Brief.
The major thesis of the first part of the brief is that Bakke has
given rise to social expectations that "strongly militate against
reversal of [Bakke's] instructions to universities. ' 9 The argument
here is that in Bakke, Justice Powell outlined a coordination of
constitutional mandates with university admissions programs that is
reasonable and properly subject to reliance. The brief argues that, on
the one hand, Justice Powell properly rejected the use by universities
of "rigid race-based classifications" because they offend the
Constitution and do "not further either diversity or educational
interests more generally." 2"°  Thus, rigid racial classifications are
inconsistent not only with constitutional law but with the academic
241
mission. On the other hand, the brief applauds Justice Powell's
approval of the use of race as a "consideration. 24 2 The Deans argue
that this approval allows universities to foster racial diversity in the
classroom in accordance with their professional judgment about their
academic mission.2'  Thus, the Deans imply that Justice Powell's
opinion achieved a proper harmonization of constitutional law and
the academic mission of universities.
In support of this position, the Deans invoke several subsidiarity
themes in arguing that a diversity admissions program of the sort
approved by Justice Powell serves the common good; that the Deans,
in the exercise of their professional judgment and responsibility have
for years employed such a program; that academic institutions should
be accorded the freedom to employ such programs in pursuit of their
educational mission; and that it would accordingly be inappropriate
for the judiciary to pressure universities to abandon such programs.
In this first part of their argument, the Deans emphasize that a
racially sensitive admissions program in law school serves the
common good by "enhancing learning, improving the profession, and
furthering the progress of this Nation."244 Seeking acknowledgement
239. Id. at *4.
240. Id. at *6.
241. Id. at *7 ("[A] rigid quota.., could lead the school to admit unqualified students,
which would undermine the school's educational mission [and] could also hamper a
university's ability to admit non-racially diverse students.").
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., id. at *4, *5, *11, *12, *16.
244. Id. at *4. The contribution to the common good achieved by race-conscious
admissions in law school is the principal theme of the amicus brief of the Association of
American Law Schools. The AALS argued that affirmative action programs like the one
under challenge "are essential if law schools are to play their vital social role of producing
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and deference for their initiative and responsibility, the Deans assert
that they and other academic professionals have employed admissions
practices "forged over years of experience and carefully crafted to
adhere to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke."2 5 Indeed, the Deans
assert that "[a] diverse student body is nothing less than fundamental
to enabling the Law School Deans to fulfill their high responsibility as
educators., 246  Accordingly, they contend that "each academic
institution should be free to decide how best to further its educational
and social missions.,
247
Faced with the threat of judicial interference with admissions
standards forged by academic professionals "over years of
experience" in attempted compliance with Bakke, the Deans state
that it would be "inappropriate for federal courts to determine for
[academic] institutions the weight that should be accorded such
standards during the admissions process., 24 8 The Deans express their
belief that "any judicial pressure to adopt a race-blind admissions
process will threaten the quality and diversity of their student bodies,
as well as a profession that is dedicated to serving society as a
whole., 249 Accordingly, they conclude that "this Court should not use
the judicial power to deprive universities of the freedom to take race
into account as one factor" in a diversity admissions program.5 The
Deans assert that in the twenty-five years since Bakke "[n]ot only
have universities extensively relied on [the Bakke] decision, but
thousands of students have been schooled against its backdrop., 251 ' As
did the Law School, the Deans invoke the plurality opinion in
lawyers, judges, and public servants for an increasingly multiracial and multiethnic
society." Brief for Ass'n of Am. Law Schs. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399076, at *2.
245. Individual Deans' Brief, supra note 231, at *16.
246. Id. at *11.
247. Id. at *17.
248. Id. at *16.
249. Id. at *4 ("Forcing universities to adopt such an admissions process would cause a
dramatic change in social practice and would frustrate expectations that, while different
from school to school, have crystallized around Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, and
have become firmly engrained in universities today.").
250. Id. at *18.
251. Id. The academy's reliance on Bakke is a common theme of several of the law
school's amici. See, e.g., Brief for Ass'n of Am. Law Schs., supra note 244, at *21-30; Brief
for Amherst Coll. et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
(No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399075, at *27-29; Brief for Am. Law Deans Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399070, at
*30; and Brief for the Society of Am. Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-242), 2003 WL 399060, at *24-26.
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey252 for several reliance points, including
the assertion that during the decades since Bakke, "'people have
organized' their educational decisions" based on that decision.253
They conclude that Bakke is "one of the few cases that has so
completely ordered American education.""54
This reference to Bakke's ordering of American education
emphasizes the point, important to subsidiarity concerns, that Bakke
has achieved a coordination and harmonization of constitutional law
and the activities of universities and professional schools. The Deans
argue that overturning Bakke would disappoint long-standing
academic reliance on that decision and disrupt the coordination it
achieved. "It would be a wrenching tear in the fabric of the law
schools' operations to undo that reliance," the brief asserts.2
Echoing a point made in the Law School's brief, the Deans assert that
if Bakke were overturned, "a sharp re-segregation of higher
education would inevitably occur. 25 6  Given the implications for
federally funded private schools, the Deans state dramatically that
"[t]he resultant social upheaval - affecting millions of students,
thousands of institutions of higher education, the legal profession,
and society at large - would be immense and irreparable.,
257
2. Part II of the Brief
In Part II of their brief, the Deans argue that acknowledgment of
university autonomy requires re-affirmation of Bakke. As we have
seen, the Law School's brief makes only one explicit reference to
university "autonomy." '258 Linking academic autonomy and discretion
with educational mission, the Law School starts with an unchallenged
premise that "law schools need the autonomy and discretion to decide
that teaching about the role of race in our society and legal system,
and preparing their students to function effectively as leaders after
graduation, are critically important aspects of their educational
252. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality).
253. Individual Deans' Brief, supra note 231, at *18.
254. Id. at *19 (emphasis added).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. Perhaps implicitly alluding to the issue of durational limits on race-conscious
admissions programs, the Deans state that "[a]s societal patterns change, it is to be
expected that law schools will change their practices accordingly." Id. at *18.
258. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *25.
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missions." '259 On this premise, the Law School builds its conclusion
that "pursuit of those goals is greatly enhanced by the presence of
meaningful diversity among the law school's student body."'2 6 And
the Law School did not argue for the First Amendment as a
constitutional basis for academic autonomy.
In stark contrast, the Deans announce at the outset of their
argument that "[a]t stake in this case is the very freedom of academic
institutions to act within reasonable bounds to further their academic
and social missions., 261 They devote Part II of their argument entirely
to academic autonomy as a reason for reaffirming Bakke and the
Sixth Circuit's judgment, warning that "[a]cademic autonomy is at the
heart of this challenge to the University of Michigan's admissions
process..., 262 In this Part, the Deans repeatedly invoke autonomy
63
and provide an extended discussion of Supreme Court case law
264grounding academic autonomy in purported constitutional interests.
In addition to quoting the passages from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Keyshian and Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Sweezy quoted in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion - both of which
explicitly rely on the First Amendment - the Deans rely heavily on
the post-Bakke case of Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,265
in which the Court invokes academic autonomy to support the
University of Michigan against a due process challenge. 266 In addition
to citing Keyshian and other cases for the Supreme Court's
recognition of "the strong First Amendment interest in deferring to
universities in the academic setting, '' 267 the Deans quote Ewing for the
point that "'autonomous decision making by the academy itself' is
necessary for [academic] freedom to thrive. 268
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Individual Deans' Brief, supra note 231, at *3 (emphasis added).
262. Id. at *21 (emphasis added).
263. Id. at *19, *20, *21, *22, *24, *26.
264. Id. at *19-24.
265. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
266. Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); 2003 WL
554398, at *3, *19, *21-22.
267. Id. at *20 (emphasis added).
268. Id. at *21-22 (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12). The Law School's brief
mentioned Ewing only once in a footnote in support of the proposition that "[t]his Court
has frequently held that constitutional doctrines must be flexible enough to accommodate
the unique needs of the educational environment." Brief for the Respondent, supra note
167, at *29 n.43.
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Having set forth this broad constitutional basis for academic
freedom, the Deans repeatedly warn against purported dangers of
judicial interference in the academic process. Linking, as did the Law
School, academic autonomy with the academic mission," the Deans
assert that "admissions officials should have the freedom, without fear
of federal judicial intervention, to review and consider an applicant's
entire accomplishments and background in admitting a class that will
further their schools' mission.""27  The Deans conclude that "[a]
decision by this Court to force 'race neutrality' in the admissions
process would be inconsistent with Bakke, inconsistent with the
principles of stare decisis, and inconsistent with the principles of
academic autonomy.""27
In conclusion, it should be noted that in making their autonomy
argument, the Deans put forward an additional argument that was
not made by the Law School. The Deans rely on the fact that the
Michigan Constitution makes the University of Michigan
"constitutionally autonomous from the [state] government." '272 Thus,
in the Deans' view, "[f]ederal court interference would be an even
more drastic interference as it would pit the power of the federal
judiciary against a state actor with special constitutional significance,
the University of Michigan., 273  Thus, the Deans assert, "[v]ital
principles of federalism are therefore at stake, 274 and the Supreme
Court "should accord substantial deference to the University of
Michigan's decisions" with respect to the authority conferred on it by
the people of Michigan.
2 75
B. The Amherst Brief76
Amherst and the colleges and universities joining in its brief
describe themselves as "highly selective" and make the issue of
selectivity in admissions prominent in their brief.277 Amherst follows
Justice Powell's lead in emphasizing the importance of the academic
269. Id. at *25.
270. Individual Deans' Brief, supra note 231, at *20 (emphasis added).
271. Id. at *26 (emphasis added).
272. Id. at *24.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *25 (emphasis added).
276. Brief for Amherst Coll. et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516), 2003 WL 399075. Twenty-seven other colleges and
universities joined Amherst's amicus brief.
277. See, e.g., id. at *1-3, *5.
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mission27 and, as did the Law School, Amherst links diversity and
selectivity as components of its academic mission. The brief argues
that the decision of highly selective colleges to employ diversity
admissions programs is based on their educational experience and
expertise2 " and serves their educational mission."
As did the Individual Deans, Amherst argues that Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion outlined a harmonization of academic
interest in diversity admissions and constitutional law upon which the
academic world has relied."" Amherst argues that in the Grutter case,
"the beginning of wisdom is to recognize, as Justice Powell and a
majority of the Court did in [Bakke], that educators have set the
relevant policies," and they have done so for "sound educational
reasons."'" "[U]pending the world that Bakke created" '283 and
disrupting diversity admissions programs at highly selective colleges
would have adverse consequences for the common good, "seriously
impeding the goal of preparing the ablest minority leaders for society
and the professions. '" ' Continuing the theme of the common good,
Amherst supports the Law School's admissions program by arguing
that no alternatives for diversity admissions suggested by petitioner
will come close to achieving the educational and social benefits
realized by policies that embrace diversity while maintaining high
educational standards.8
Accordingly, Amherst argues that judicial "[d]eference to the
colleges' educational judgments that diversity is a core component of
the education they are seeking to provide is plainly called for."
' ' 6
278. As did the Law School and the Individual Deans, Amherst particularly
emphasizes the role of the academic "mission." See, e.g., id. at *2, *7, *19-21.
279. See, e.g., id. at *2, *4-5, *7.
280. See, e.g., id. at *19-21.
281. For example, Amherst praises "the central insights underlying the sharp
distinction Justice Powell drew in Bakke" between quota-based diversity admissions and
the Harvard College approach; "the former could fairly be said to deny the equal
protection of law, while the latter could not." Id. at *16 (referencing 438 U.S. at 318).
282. Id. at *4-5; see also id. at *7 ("the relevant judgments are educational judgments,
made by educators and those responsible for educational institutions.").
283. Id. at *28.
284. Id. at *15 (quoting WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE
RIVER: LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 51 (1998)).
285. Id. at *13-16. The Association of American Law Schools also argued that "none
of the proposed alternatives is feasible for selective law schools." Brief for Ass'n of Am.
Law Schs. supra note 244, at *3 (emphasis added).
286. Id. at *26-27. The need for judicial deference is strongly emphasized in the brief:
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Amherst links this appeal to judicial deference to an appeal for re-
affirmation of Bakke: "The judicial deference owed to colleges and
universities, joined to the wise policy of stare decisis, counsels against
any resolution of these cases that would interfere with the powers of
colleges and universities generally ... to experiment and pursue their
own judgments as to how to best use their resources for educational
and charitable purposes ....
C. The Brief of the American Law Deans Association288
Most notable in the Deans Association's brief is that it argues for
four compelling interests supporting race-conscious admissions
programs. 29  The first of these is "[t]he [i]nterest in [a]voiding
[r]esegregation. ' '21 In arguing for this interest, the Association asserts
that "highly selective admission standards are central to the mission
of most law schools, 291 and that a race-conscious admissions policy "is
the one successful method that has enabled selective schools to
satisfy" the interest in avoiding resegregation of their student
bodies.292 The Association argues that "[t]his marginal consideration
of race is essential to negate the segregative impact of highly selective
admission standards., 293 Race-blind admissions, in the Association's
view, would dramatically reduce minority enrollment in selective law
schools, which would then be perceived as segregative "in the court of
public opinion. 2 94 The Association concludes that "all law schools
have a compelling interest in avoiding the appearance of deliberate
"Displacement of a college or university's core prerogatives.., would be an extraordinary
departure from the deference that courts have long shown to institutions of higher
education generally, and particularly private institutions." Id. at *27; see also id. at *26,
*29.
287. Id. at *29-30. As in the Individual Deans' brief, Amherst's principal case for
judicial deference is Ewing. Id. at *3, *25-27.
288. Brief for Am. Law Deans Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399070.
289. The Deans Association also endorses a fifth interest - "the compelling interest in
diverse experiences and perspectives in the classroom" - argued in the law school's brief,
but the Association states that its brief will not repeat that argument. Id. at *4.
290. Id.
291. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). As did the Law School and Amherst, the Association
follows Justice Powell's lead in stressing the concept of the academic mission. The
Association's brief makes ten references to this mission. Id. at *1, *2, *5, *8, *9 (four
times), *11, *12.
292. Id. at *6.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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racial exclusion.,
295
Thus, as did Amherst, the Association makes selectivity an
important factor in its argument. But the Association goes further.
In contrast to the other briefs we have considered, the Association
identifies (as a second compelling interest) "the interest in selective
admissions standards." '296 The Association argues that "[f]aw schools
have a compelling interest in not abandoning the pursuit of academic
excellence or other components of their respective missions" and that
"[c]onsideration of race has preserved these interests. ' '297 Relying on
"statistical studies and faculty experience," the Association concludes
that "the end of affirmative action would create inexorable pressure
to distort or reduce [admission] standards., 291
The other compelling interests advanced by the Association are
the interest, particularly of public law schools, in "serving the whole
state ', 299  and "the interest in remedying past and present
discrimination in public education."3°° With respect to the former, the
Association asserts that "law schools ... train a disproportionate
share of the future political leadership of the state and nation" and
argues that "[f]ailure to educate a leadership class among
disadvantaged minority populations would be a permanent threat to
equality and social stability., 30 1 With respect to the remedial interest,
the Association argues32 that this interest "is not a response to mere
'societal discrimination"' because "law schools are parts of
educational systems" and "cannot ignore the unequal output of the




295. Id. at *7.
296. Id.
297. Id. at *9. See also Brief for Ass'n of Am. Law Schs., supra note 244, at *5-10
(proffering evidence that "law schools, particularly ones with highly selective admissions
processes, produce a significant proportion of high public officials.").
298. Id. at *7.
299. Id. at *12.
300. Id. at *14.
301. Id. at *12.
302. Obviously with a view to Justice Powell's rejection of an interest in remedying
"societal discrimination." See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-309.
303. Brief for Ass'n of Am. Law Schs., supra note 244, at *15. The Society of American
Law Teachers also argued that "the necessity of remedying past and present
discrimination provides a compelling interest sufficient to justify the inclusion of race as a
factor in the admission process." Brief for the Society of Am. Law Teachers as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399060 at
*3. As did the Deans Association, the Society documents a history of discrimination in
primary education (the Society's brief focuses exclusively on discrimination within the
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V1. The Supreme Court's Decision in Grutter
At issue in Grutter v. Bollinger was the University of Michigan
Law School's admissions program, which sought to admit a "critical
mass of underrepresented minority students.., so as to realize the
educational benefits of a diverse student body."'  This program was
challenged as racially discriminatory in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.305 Trial
was conducted in federal district court, which held the University's
admissions program unconstitutional and ordered the University not
to use race as a factor in its admissions decisions.' On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit, en banc, reversed, concluding that Justice Powell's
Bakke opinion was binding precedent establishing diversity as a
compelling state interest and that the University's admissions
program survived strict judicial scrutiny.' The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine "[w]hether diversity is a compelling
interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting
applicants for admission to public universities."3 8
Because the Court had not addressed race-conscious admissions
programs in more than twenty-five years since Bakke. 9 and because
of the importance of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion as argued in
briefs submitted by the Law School and its amici, l° the Grutter Court
reviewed Justice Powell's opinion prior to conducting its
constitutional analysis of the Law School's admissions program. "
The Court cites in particular the amicus briefs filed by the Individual
Deans and Amherst College in expressing the Court's
acknowledgment that in the ensuing years academic institutions have
state of Michigan) and argues that "affirmative action at the higher education level is
necessary to provide a full remedy for discrimination in the lower grade levels." Id. at *14.
And as did the Deans Association, the Society argued that the discrimination it identifies
is not merely "what [the Supreme Court] has defined as societal discrimination." Id. at *2.
304. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318 (reporting on the district court testimony of the Law
School's Director of Admissions explaining the meaning of "critical mass.").
305. Id. at 317.
306. Id. at 321.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 322 (noting a Circuit split on this issue).
309. Id.
310. See id. at 323.
311. This is done in Part II.A of the Court's Opinion. Id. at 322-26, Part L.A gives a
(favorable) preliminary account of the Law School's admissions policy. Id. at 312-16. Part
I.B provides a prior history of the litigation, with a discussion of key testimony in the
district court. Id. at 316-22. Part II.B discusses the strict scrutiny test for Equal Protection
Clause analysis, while noting the importance of context for such analysis. Id. at 326-27.
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acted in accordance with Justice Powell's opinion: "Public and private
universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions
programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible race-conscious
policies. 31 2 The Court states that because of this modeling, it will
discuss Justice Powell's opinion "in some detail. 3 3  After briefly
reviewing Justice Powell's reasons for rejecting three of the purposes
offered by UC Davis in support of its special admissions program,314
the Court states that the only one of Davis' purposes that Justice
Powell "approved" was "the attainment of a diverse student body.,
315
Of significance for its subsequent constitutional analysis of the Law
School's admissions program, the Court further states that, in support
of this approval, "Justice Powell grounded his analysis in the
academic freedom that "long has been viewed as a special concern of
the First Amendment." '316 The Court notes Justice Powell's emphasis
on the statement he quoted from Keyshian to support the proposition
about the common good that the nation depends on leaders who have
benefited from educational diversity.317 And, in its first reference to
the academic "mission," the Court quotes Justice Powell's statement
that in arguing that it had the right to seek students who will
contribute to what Justice Brennan in Keyshian refers to as "the
robust exchange of ideas," UC Davis was "seeking to achieve a goal
that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission. 318
After this review, the Court states that it need not decide an
issue that was contested by the parties as to whether Justice Powell's
opinion constitutes binding precedent because it "endorse[s] Justice
Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest
that can justify the use of race in university admissions. 3 9 Adopting
312. Id. at 323. Note that the Court avoids, here and elsewhere in its opinion, saying
that the Law School or other academic institutions have "relied" on Justice Powell's
Bakke opinion. The Court "endorse[s] Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is
a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions," id. at
325, and so it does not need to employ a Casey-based argument on reliance.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 323-324.
315. Id. at 324 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311).
316. Id. (quoting 438 U.S. at 312). The Court does not include in this quote the clause
Justice Powell inserted stating that academic freedom is "not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right." As noted above, see supra note 111, this clause in Justice Powell's
opinion replaced a clause in a prior draft by Justice Powell that read: "though not a
constitutional right in itself."]
317. Id. at 324 (quoting 438 U.S. at 313).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 325.
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Justice Powell's opinion also made it unnecessary for the Court to
employ a reliance argument, based on the plurality opinion in Casey,
offered by the Law School and by the Individual Deans. Instead, the
Court's endorsement of Justice Powell's conclusions implicitly accepts
the argument, also suggested by the Law School and by Amherst, that
Justice Powell's opinion established a viable harmonization of the
academic interest in diversity and the requirements of equal
protection.32°
When the Court turns (in Part III of its opinion) to constitutional
scrutiny of the Law School's admissions program, its opinion reflects six
subsidiarity themes that are crucial to its conclusion in favor of the Law
School. These concepts are "context," "deference, 32' "mission,"
institutional expertise, "autonomy," and service to the common good. The
broadest of these in scope (and the first to be mentioned in Part Ell) is
context. The Court notes at the outset that the Law School asserted only an
interest in diversity as a justification of its admissions program322 and that the
Law School asked the Court to recognize this interest as compelling "in the
context of higher education."' In its discussion of strict scrutiny in Part 11.B
of its opinion, the Court established the ground for this point by stating that
"[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under
the Equal Protection Clause. 3 24 The Court explained that "strict scrutiny is
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance
and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental
decisionmaker for the use of race in [the] particular context."3 25
320. Much of the Grutter Court's analysis purporting to show the harmonization of the
Law School's admissions program with constitutional rights is presented in Part III.B of its
Opinion on the second prong of Equal Protection analysis, which I do not discuss in this
paper. 539 U.S. at 357-61.
321. For a survey of cases in which courts have given deference to educators, see
Edward N. Stoner II & J. Michael Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational Judgment:
Justice O'Connors' Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding Principles, As Shown By
Rulings Involving College Students in the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J.C. & U.L.
583 (2004). The authors state that "[it is an honor for college administrators that the
Supreme Court has selected higher education as the one unique community in our society
eligible for such judicial deference." Id. at 617. For another article exploring the
appropriateness of such deference, see Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter,
School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691 (2004).
322. The Court finds the diversity interest to be compelling and does not invoke any of
the four additional interests asserted to be compelling in the amicus brief of the American
Law Deans Association. See supra note 288.
323. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (emphasis added).
324. Id. at 327 (citing Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 343-44, and quoting the passage from
Gomillion reproduced above). See supra note 52.
325. Id.
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Having prepared the way with this acknowledgment of the
importance of context, the Court introduces its conclusion in support
of the Law School's diversity goal by linking three of the other
subsidiarity themes: "The Law School's educational judgment that
such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we
defer."'326 The Court follows this pronouncement by invoking another
subsidiarity theme, academic autonomy."' Thus, as did Justice
Powell, the Grutter Court places at the outset of its analysis
recognition of "a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First
Amendment, of educational autonomy."3'2 The Court links autonomy
to the academic mission by quoting Justice Powell's conclusion that
by invoking a First Amendment autonomy interest a university "must
be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission. 3 29 Quoting a statement
from Justice Powell in support of deference, the Court concludes that
diversity is a compelling interest because "attaining a diverse student
body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission
and that 'good faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent
'a showing to the contrary."' 3
Perhaps the heaviest work in the Grutter Court's opinion
supporting the Law School is done through the concept of the Law
School's mission and the related concept of service to the common
good. As noted above, the Law School argued that "academic
selectivity and student body diversity, including racial diversity, are
both integral to [its] educational mission."33 The question must be
asked: what does the Court take to be the Law School's mission? In
Part I.A of its opinion, the Court noted that "[sjeeking to 'admit a
326. Id. at 328 (emphasis added). With respect to deference, the Court states that
"[o]ur holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits." Id. at 328-329
(citing Ewing, Bakke, and Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96
n.6 (1978). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas criticizes the Court for "its
unprecedented deference to the Law School - a deference antithetical to strict scrutiny -
on an idea of 'educational autonomy' grounded in the First Amendment." 539 U.S. at 362
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas went on to critique the Court's use of Keyshian
and of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy. Id. at 362-364.
327. Id. at 329. As we have seen, the Law School did not emphasize the autonomy
argument. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167. But this argument was stressed
in the Individual Deans' Brief. See Individual Deans' Brief, supra note 231, at *25.
328. Id.
329. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).
330. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-319).
331. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *1.
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group of students who individually and collectively are among the
most capable,' the Law School looks for individuals with 'substantial
promise for success in law school' and 'a strong likelihood of
succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways to
the well-being of others."'332  Adumbrated here is the interest in
selectivity - that the Law School's mission is the education of an elite.
This interest in selectivity is not focused on in conjunction with
diversity333 until later in the opinion when the Court quotes from an
amicus brief filed by "high-ranking retired officers and civilian
leaders of the United States military" for the point that "[t]o fulfill its
mission, the military 'must be selective in admissions for training and
education and it must train and educate a highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps in a racially diverse setting."' 114 The Court states
its agreement with the brief's suggestion that "'[i]t requires only a
small step from this analysis to conclude that our country's other most
selective institutions must remain both diverse and selective."335
Shortly after favorably quoting this amicus brief,336 the Court
again links the mission of the Law School as a selective institution
with its service to the national common good.337 The Court states that
332. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312 (quoting the Appendix at 110).
333. In the context of evaluating the Law School's notion of "critical mass," the Court
alluded to the conjunction of selectivity and diversity by referring to the Law School's goal
of "assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and broadly
diverse." Id. at 329.
334. Id. at 331 (quoting Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516), 2003 WL 1787554,
at *27) (emphasis added, except for "and" which was emphasized in the amicus brief). For
Law School President Bollinger's comment on this brief, see Bollinger, supra note 81, at
1594.
335. Id. (quoting Brief for Julius Becton, Jr. et al., supra note 334, at *27).
336. Just before quoting from the Becton Brief, the Court cited two amicus briefs filed
by corporations in support of the Law School to buttress the Court's statement that the
benefits of educational diversity "are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas, and viewpoints." Id. at 330-331 (citing Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 01-1447), 2001 WL 34624918, at *5;
and Brief for General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 01-1447), 2001 WL 34624915, at *3-4). For Law School President
Bollinger's appreciation of the General Motors Brief, see Bollinger, supra note 81, at 1594.
337. In Part II.A (in which the Court reviews Justice Powell's Opinion), the Court
quoted Justice Powell's statement about "the nation's future" with the partial quotation
from Keyshian: "the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure'
to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples." Id. at 324
(quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (quoting Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603)).
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"universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training
ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders.""33 The Court then
notes that more than half of the members of the U.S. Senate and
more than a third of the members of the House of Representatives
are law school graduates.339 Emphasizing the selectivity point, the
Court next mentions that graduates of "a handful" of "highly
selective law schools" account for 25 U.S. Senators, 74 U.S. Court of
Appeals judges, and "nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States
District Court judges."34
Thus, the Court appears to accept the Law School's argument
that both selectivity and diversity are integral to its mission.4 That
the Court so understands the Law School's mission becomes clear
when the Court considers certain suggestions made by petitioner
Grutter and by the United States that the Law School, consistently
with the Equal Protection Clause, could achieve diversity by relaxing
its academic standards through one or another mechanisms. The
Court holds that the Law School need not accept such options, stating
that compliance with the second prong of equal protection scrutiny
"does not require a university to choose between maintaining a
reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups., 342 The
suggestion that the Law School lower its admissions standards, the
Court says, "would require the Law School to become a much
different institution and sacrifice a vital component of its educational
mission. "3" Suggestions for other plans that would diminish the elite
status of the Law School "may preclude the university from...
assembl(ing] a student body that is not just diverse, but diverse along
all the qualities valued by the university."3" Emphasizing again that
selectivity is vital to the Law School's mission, the Court concludes
that the School has no constitutional obligation to adopt alternative
plans that would "forc[e] the Law School to abandon the academic
338. Id. at 332 (citing Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)).
339. Id. (citing Brief for Ass'n of Am. Law Schs., supra note 244, at *5-6).
340. Id. (citing Brief for Ass'n of Am. Law Schs., supra note 244, at *6).
341. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *25 ("[L]aw schools need
the autonomy and discretion to decide that teaching about the role of race in our society
and legal system, and preparing their students to function effectively as leaders after
graduation, are critically important aspects of their institutional missions.").
342. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (citing cases).
343. Id. at 340.
344. Id.
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selectivity that is the cornerstone of its educational mission."345
A potential problem must be noted at this point. Acceptance of
the proposition that a highly selective law school may relax its
standards to a limited degree in order to admit members of racial
minorities while still maintaining its elite status might give rise to an
objection that the goal of the diversity program is in fact to remedy
the effects of past discrimination in order to assist minority graduates
in assuming leadership positions from which they otherwise might be
excluded. 6 The Court implicitly addresses this objection by casting
the selectivity component of the Law School's mission in the context
of equality of opportunity. This argument was adumbrated to some
extent in the Law School's brief when the Law School argued that
overruling Bakke would lead to "a chilling prospect., 34 '7  Explaining
this prediction, the Law School asserted that "[a]s our country
becomes increasingly racially diverse, the public confidence in law
enforcement and legal institutions so iessential to the coherence and
stability of our society will be difficult to maintain if the segments of
the bench and bar.., again become the preserve for white graduates,
trained in isolation from the communities they serve.,
34
1
Perhaps picking up on the Law School's suggestion, the Court
345. Id. This point reflects the argument stressed by the Individual Deans against
judicial interference that would "force" law schools to suppress their educational
judgment and distort the academic mission. See Individual Deans' Brief, supra note 231,
at *2.
346. Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas criticized the Court majority for implicitly
accepting without justification that the Law School has a compelling interest in remaining
a highly selective institution. See 539 U.S. 361 (Scalia, J., dissenting; Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Unlike the Law School, the American Law Deans Association made an
independent argument that law schools have a compelling interest in selective admissions
standards. See Brief for Am. Law Deans Ass'n, supra note 288, at *3-16. The Grutter
Court declined the invitation of the Deans Association to establish selectivity as a
compelling interest and instead followed the Law School's approach, which argued only
for diversity as a compelling interest, while yoking selectivity to diversity as integral to its
mission.
347. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 167, at *20. In addition, the Law School
quotes from the amicus brief of the United States for the proposition that "keeping
undergraduate and graduate institutions open to 'people of all races and ethnicities' is 'a
paramount government objective."' Id. at *22 (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 176635, at *13).
348. Id. at *20-21. It should be noted here that the Law School's point about the
country becoming "increasingly racially diverse" might suggest a temporally limitless
extension of affirmative action admissions. Despite this suggestion, the Law School
argued that it "of course, recognizes that race-conscious programs must have reasonable
durational limits." Id. at *32. The Court accepted the latter point. Grutter, 539 U.S. at
342 ("[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time.").
349. Or perhaps on a statement in the amicus brief of the United States. See supra
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asserts that "the diffusion 'of knowledge and opportunity through
public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all
individuals regardless of race or ethnicity."'35  After citing the
statistics on elite law school graduates in leadership positions,35' the
Court states:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must
have confidence in the openness and integrity of the
educational institutions that provide 
this training.
This move by the Grutter Court takes a key subsidiarity theme
(service to the common good) and construes it in a way that
constitutes a new argument for diversity admissions that was not
emphasized by Justice Powell. Construing the contribution of a law
school's selective admissions program as opening the educational
path to leadership to all rather than as an attempt to remedy societal
discrimination353 or to increase the number of minority lawyers
establishes a new argument that defers to educational judgment while
acknowledging that such judgment serves a constitutional concern for
equality of opportunity.
In sum, the Grutter Court's opinion relies crucially on several
themes that sound in subsidiarity. The Court states that in enforcing
constitutional mandates a court must be sensitive to context - the
context here being higher education. It relies on the concept
articulated by Justice Powell that academic institutions have an
important mission that serves the common good. As did Justice
Powell, the Court invokes the First Amendment as protective of
academic autonomy but this invocation does not prevent the Court
from elaborating on subsidiarity themes. The Court states that it will
note 235, at *. The American Law Deans Association also argued that rejection of race-
conscious admissions programs would reduce minority enrollment in selective law schools,
which would then be perceived as segregated "in the court of public opinion." Brief for
Am. Law Deans, supra note 288, at *6.
350. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added).
351. Id. at 332 (citing Brief for Ass'n of Am. Law Schs., supra note 244).
352. Id. In another reference to public perception (pointing in a contrary direction),
the Court insists that racial preferences must have a durational limit that "'assure[s] all
citizens that the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary
matter..." Id. at 342 (quoting. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion)).
353. The Court implicitly accepts Justice Powell's view that remedying societal
discrimination is not a compelling interest. The Law School declined to assert such an
interest, but the American Law Deans Association did so, see supra note 231, without
success.
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defer to the Law School's institutional expertise and educational
judgment regarding its mission. Of particular importance in this case,
the Court accepts the Law School's argument that its mission includes
both diversity and selectivity. The Court finds that the dual nature of
the Law School's mission has important benefits for the national
common good. Of great importance in this regard, the Court finds
that such a dual mission contributes to the public perception of the
legitimacy of elite educational institutions and serves the goal of
equality of opportunity.
Conclusion
Neither Justice Powell's Bakke opinion nor the Grutter Court's
majority opinion explicitly invokes the subsidiarity principle, yet both
can be seen to employ subsidiarity concepts and concerns at
important turns in their arguments. Focusing on these concepts is
heuristically beneficial in bringing to light crucial points in Justice
Powell's opinion and the later acceptance and development of these
points in the Grutter litigation by the Law School, its amici, and the
Court.
The most important subsidiarity concept deployed by Justice
Powell is the concept of the academic mission. In its briefs, UC Davis
invoked a number of purposes (including diversity) in support of its
special admissions program, but in arguing for diversity it did not
offer an argument that explicitly linked diversity to any of its various
"missions." Nor did it propose an argument grounding any of its
missions in the First Amendment. But, relying on Court precedents,
Justice Powell made the First Amendment prominent as protective of
the University, and on this basis he constructed a concept of a unitary
academic mission whose educational goal required a robust exchange
of ideas valued by the First Amendment. This provided Justice
Powell with a basis for concluding that an admissions program
premised on the value of student exposure to the diverse viewpoints
of their fellows was "of paramount importance" to the academic
mission."'354  In light of UC Davis's omission of such arguments,
Justice Powell's opinion must be seen as an original contribution in
the development of constitutional arguments involving the academy.
Of great interest in Bakke as well is the fact that Justice Powell's
invocation of the First Amendment in support of the University did
not prevent him from extending his analysis in ways that articulate
"4 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
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other subsidiarity concepts and concerns. Most importantly, Justice
Powell, in accord with the Court precedents he cites, uses the First
Amendment, not to close further inquiry but as a means for
articulating the service to the national common good that universities
provide through their exercise of academic freedom. This
development of a concept of the academic mission in service to the
common good provides a reason for acknowledging the importance of
context in the application of a constitutional provision restraining a
subsidiary institution. Justice Powell's analysis also provides a reason
for recognizing the discretion of university administrators and for
cautioning against judicial interference in the academic mission.
In the Grutter litigation, the Law School and its amici (as
represented by those amici discussed above) rely heavily on Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion and argue that Justice Powell outlined a
proper harmonization of the academic interest in diversity with equal
protection concerns. The Law School and its amici seize on the
prominence Justice Powell gave to this subsidiarity concept and stress
its importance to the Law School's interest in diversity. And because
selectivity in admissions had been raised as an issue in the Grutter
litigation, the Law School and some of its amici argued that selectivity
was also an integral component of the Law School's mission. Despite
the fact that Justice Powell had not given explicit consideration to
selectivity, his opinion established the conditions for the success of
such an argument by emphasizing the contributions to the national
common good achieved by universities in training leaders of the
nation.
In its decision in favor of the Law School's race-conscious
admissions program, the Grutter Court follows Justice Powell in
relying on subsidiarity concepts and concerns. It agrees with Justice
Powell's establishment of the First Amendment as a support for
recognition of the academic mission and for concluding that a
diversity admissions program serves this mission. But as in Justice
Powell's opinion, the Court's invocation of a First Amendment
interest in favor of the academy does not prevent it from extending its
analysis in ways that rely on further subsidiarity concerns. The Court
looks for and finds, in the briefs of the Law School's amici, support
for the proposition that a race-conscious admissions program
substantially serves the common good.
With respect to the new issue in the Grutter litigation
(selectivity), the Court agrees with the Law School and its amici that
the broad academic interest that Justice Powell recognized, in serving
the national common good through education of potential national
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leaders, justifies inclusion of selectivity as an integral component of
the Law School's academic mission. And in what may be its major
original contribution to the subsidiarity arguments set forth by Justice
Powell, the Grutter Court (in accord with suggestions by the Law
School and one of its amici) casts the common good argument as an
argument for equality of opportunity and the legitimacy of elite
academic institutions. In light of all these conclusions, the Court
implicitly invokes other subsidiarity concerns in stating that context is
important in applying constitutional mandates and that it will defer to
the Law School's educational judgment that diversity and selectivity
are essential to its educational mission.
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